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Abstract
A singular thought can intuitively be understood as a thought that is directly about a 
particular thing, e.g., a non-conceptual thought about B.B. King, Mont Blanc, or your most 
beloved pet. The consensus within the singular thought literature has been that Gareth Evans 
(1982) develops a theory of  singular thought throughout his posthumously published work 
The Varieties of  Reference. However, Evans never claims to be developing a theory of  singular 
thought, nor does the locution ‘singular thought’ appear more than a handful of  times 
throughout the work. The singular thought literature lacks any substantial exegetical 
engagement with the theory of  singular thought that Evans argues for — including an 
account as to why Evans should be interpreted as offering a theory of  singular thought, as 
well as how he should be so interpreted. The interpretation of  Evans that I wish to argue for 
is one according to which a singular thought (for Evans) is an object-dependent thought, the 
thinking of  which requires the satisfaction of  Russell’s Principle. Liberalism is the thesis that 
there is no general acquaintance constraint on singular thought. Many contemporary 
Liberalists, including semantic instrumentalists and cognitivists, are quick to argue that 
Evans’ theory of  singular thought is incorrect. What I seek to demonstrate is that, armed 
with a proper understanding of  Evans’ theory of  singular thought, most recent Liberalist 
critiques of  Evans are unsuccessful because they either misevaluate or misidentify the 
explicandum with which Evans was concerned. 




Summary for Lay Audience 
A singular thought can intuitively be understood as a thought that is directly about a 
particular object, e.g., a thought about your most beloved pet or Elvis Presley. The academic 
consensus is that Gareth Evans (1982) develops a theory of  singular thought throughout his 
work The Varieties of  Reference. However, the literature on singular thought lacks any 
substantial engagement with the theory of  singular thought Evans argues for. The 
interpretation of  Evans that I wish to argue for is one according to which singular thoughts 
are object dependent and require for their understanding the satisfaction of  Russell’s 
Principle — according to which someone must be able to to distinguish an object in order to 
be able to think about it. Liberalism is the thesis that there is no general acquaintance 
constraint on singular thought, which includes a rejection of  Russell’s Principle. Many 
contemporary Liberalists are quick to argue that Evans’ theory of  singular thought is 
incorrect. What I seek to demonstrate is that, armed with a proper understanding of  Evans’ 
theory of  singular thought, most recent Liberalist critiques of  Evans are unsuccessful 
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A singular thought can intuitively be understood as a thought that is directly about a 
particular thing, e.g., a non-conceptual thought about B.B. King, Mont Blanc, or your most 
beloved pet.  The contemporary philosophical interest in singular thought largely derives 1
from two sources. First, debates in the philosophy of  language about the nature of  reference 
and the semantics/pragmatics of  propositional attitude reports is one source of  interest in 
singular thought.  Second, debates in the philosophy of  mind concerning the nature of  2
mental content and the rise of  content externalism have largely been responsible for a 
sustained interest in the topic as well.  However, the topic is of  philosophical interest for a 3
variety of  additional reasons – debates concerning singular thought engage with a host of  
metaphysical, epistemological, and aesthetical issues.   4
 The consensus within the singular thought literature is that Gareth Evans develops a 
theory of  singular thought throughout his posthumously published work The Varieties of  
Reference (1982). His view is most often characterized as a version of  the Standard View, 
according to which an epistemic acquaintance condition needs to be satisfied in order for 
someone to be able to entertain a singular thought. However, Evans never claims to be 
developing a theory of  singular thought, nor does the locution ‘singular thought’ appear 
more than a handful of  times throughout the work. This leaves us with the unusual 
exegetical difficulty of  interpreting Evans as arguing for a theory of  singular thought despite 
the fact he himself  does not characterize his position in these terms. The singular thought 
 Singular thoughts are sometimes referred to in the literature as ‘relational,’ ‘de re,’ or ‘referential,’ thoughts. 1
Descriptive thoughts, by contrast, are sometimes referred to as ‘notional,’ ‘de dicto,’ or ‘conceptual,’ thoughts. 
Exactly what the distinction between singular and descriptive thoughts is is debated in the literature. In fact, the 
very existence of  singular thoughts at all is a matter of  contention.
 For example, see Quine (1956), Strawson (1959), Donnellan (1966, 1970), Kripke (1972/1980), and Kaplan 2
(1977/1989a). 
 See Putnam (1975), Burge (1977), and Lewis (1979). 3
 For example, (i) if  singular thoughts are object-dependent and relational in nature then it would appear that 4
apparent thoughts about non-existence things do not qualify as singular, providing us with a metaphysical anti-
Meinongian argument, (ii) if  singular thoughts are inherently de re and we can communicate them to one 
another then externalism about both semantic and mental content is rendered more viable, therefore 
connecting the debate to more epistemic debates concerning the validity of  contingent a priori or necessary a 
posteriori truths, and (iii), as Stainton has suggested to me, when one is in love with someone they are in love 
with someone in particular and not a descriptively identical doppelgänger, or when one buys a piece of  art they 
are usually interested in its authenticity as the piece of  art and not merely a descriptively identical duplicate – this 
ties the debate concerning singular thought into issues in aesthetics. If  one were to discover that the person 
they were in love with had been replaced by a descriptively identical doppelgänger surely they would feel as if  
they had been wronged.   
VINDICATING  EVANS       2
literature lacks any substantial exegetical account as to why Evans should be interpreted as 
offering a theory of  singular thought, as well as how he should be so interpreted. The 
interpretation of  Evans that I wish to argue for is one according to which a singular thought 
is a Russellian (i.e., object-dependent) thought, the thinking of  which requires the satisfaction 
of  Russell’s Principle.   5
 Liberalism is the view that there is no general acquaintance restriction on singular 
thought.  Liberalism is the main thesis that is defended throughout The Reference Book by 6
Hawthorne and Manley (2012), although semantic instrumentalists (Kaplan 1989, Harman 
1977, Borg 2007) and cognitivists (Jeshion 2010) also defend the Liberalist thesis that 
acquaintance is not a necessary condition for singular thought.  Many contemporary 7
Liberalists are quick to argue that Evans’ theory of  singular thought is incorrect. What I seek 
to demonstrate is that, armed with a proper understanding of  Evans’ theory of  singular 
thought, most recent Liberalist critiques of  Evans are unsuccessful because they either 
misevaluate or misidentify the explicandum with which Evans was concerned.  
 Evans’ tragic and untimely passing in 1980 meant that he has been unable to respond 
on his own behalf  to the growing number of  Liberalist critiques of  his position. I hope that 
I will convince you to share in my frustration that none of  the proponents of  Liberalism, a 
self-consciously anti-Evans position, engage with Evans’ actual position. For example, 
although Jeshion (2010), one of  the principle proponents of  cognitivism, says that “the most 
sustained and richest theory containing a principled analysis of  acquaintance as a necessary 
condition on singular thought can be found in Evans” (14, fn. 33), she herself  fails to engage 
with the philosophical nuances of  Evans’ position in any substantial way. Likewise, despite 
devoting over half  of  their chapter on epistemic acquaintance critiquing Evans (who they 
consider as one of  the principle proponents of  epistemic acquaintance), Hawthorne and 
Manley (2012) altogether fail to even mention several theoretical terms that are imperative to 
an understanding of  Evans’ theory of  singular thought.  
 According to Russell’s Principle, “in order to be thinking about an object or to make a judgement about an 5
object, one must know which object is in question — one must know which object it is that one is thinking 
about” (Evans, 1982, 65).
 Hawthorne and Manley (2012) are responsible for the ‘Liberalist’ terminology, but several distinct views are 6
united under the heading through their unified rejection of  an acquaintance condition on singular thought (see 
Goodman and Genone 2020). 
 Some of  the most notable liberalists include Harman (1977), Kaplan (1989), Sainsbury (2005), Borg (2007), 7
Jeshion (2010), and Hawthorne and Manley (2012). 
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Chapter 2: What Is Singular Thought? 
      
§I Russell and Frege’s Vacation to Mont Blanc  
     2.1.1 Introduction  
 
Although there is no evidence that Bertrand Russell and Gottlob Frege ever vacationed 
together at Mont Blanc, the highest mountain in the Alps located on the border between 
France and Italy, they certainly exchanged a series of  letters to each other about Mont Blanc 
towards the end of  1904 that have since been published posthumously (see Frege 1980). The 
correspondence began during the summer of  1902 and consisted of  Russell revealing to 
Frege his discovery of  the famous paradox that proved disastrous to the logicist project as 
Frege had presented it in his Basic Laws of  Arithmetic (1893). Russell’s devastating news came 
just as Frege was finalizing the second volume of  Basic Laws of  Arithmetic (1903), which was 
published the year following the beginning of  their correspondence — the paradox still 
intact to Frege’s dismay. The bulk of  their exchange primarily consisted of  a series of  letters 
spanned over a two year period. The overarching aim of  their correspondence was assessing 
the viability of  various solutions to the paradox that Russell had unveiled. However, in the 
letters they touch upon a number of  other issues within philosophical logic, the foundations 
of  mathematics, metaphysics, and the philosophy of  language. Perhaps most interestingly, it 
sheds light on some ways in which their respective approaches to these issues radically differ. 
The majority of  the exchange took place during the period in which Russell had finished and 
published his second book, Principles of  Mathematics (1903). The initial correspondence from 
1902-1904 occurred prior to the advent of  Russell’s theory of  descriptions and it provides 
some additional insight into his reservations about Frege’s distinction between the Sinn and 
the Bedeutung of  an expression, prior to the concerns that were infamously expressed later on 
in ‘On Denoting’ (1905).   8
 If  their correspondence was primarily concerned with possible solutions to Russell’s 
 Throughout the remainder of  this discussion, I will translate ‘Sinn’ as ‘sense’ and ‘Bedeutung’ as 8
‘Meaning’ (capitalized so as to remind us it is a technical term). ‘Bedeutung’ has been variously translated 
‘nominatum,’ ‘semantic value,’ ‘denotation,’ ‘meaning,’ ‘reference,’ ‘significance,’ and so on. I will follow Evans 
(1982) in translating ‘Bedeutung’ as ‘Meaning’ so as to (a) facilitate any cross referencing with Varieties of  Reference, 
and (b) to more aptly mirror Russell’s own use of  the term ‘meaning’ throughout his correspondence with 
Frege. 
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Paradox, and it is unlikely that Frege and Russell ever vacationed together at Mont Blanc, 
then what is the relevance of  this section to the overall dissertation itself ? Well, in the course 
of  their correspondence they address their respective positions concerning the nature of  
judgement and propositions (in the technical sense in which they use the term), using 
thoughts about Mont Blanc as their toy example. In what way do thoughts and judgements 
about Mont Blanc involve Mont Blanc? Are such thoughts and judgements only indirectly 
about the highest mountain in the Alps, or is there a philosophically important sense in 
which such thoughts and judgements are more directly about Mont Blanc? If  propositions, 
the objects of  judgement and thought, are structured complexes (which, as we shall see, both 
Russell and Frege take them to be), then in what sense is Mont Blanc a constituent of  the 
propositions that seem to be, in some sense, about it? These are among the questions 
concerning the nature of  thought, judgement, and propositions that emerge throughout the 
correspondence between Russell and Frege. The positions they respectively advocate serve as 
a natural foil to one another, and both have been tremendously influential on subsequent 
thinking about the nature, structure, and content(s) of  both thought and propositions.  
 Therefore, the correspondence between Russell and Frege about Mont Blanc serves 
as a natural starting point for the present inquiry. There are several additional reasons why it 
makes sense to begin with Russell and Frege. First, as we shall see, it helps us in 
understanding the nature of  Russellian Propositions, which provides the theoretical 
scaffolding that has underpinned many subsequent notions of  an intimately related notion: 
that of  de re (or singular) content. In coming to understand the sense in which Russellian 
Propositions are Russellian, we will likewise come to an initial understanding of  why the 
orthodox Fregean conception of  propositions (or Gedanke) as structured complexes of  
senses seems to entail that there is no such thing as Russellian Propositions. This will 
expedite our excavation of  the notion of  de re content in Section Two, which has been the 
dominant conception of  singular thought within the literature: crudely, the dominant 
conception is that a singular thought is a thought that has de re content. Second, a brief  
examination of  Frege and Russell’s respective positions concerning the nature of  
propositions and thought is important as it is the historical foundation for subsequent 
theorizing about the nature of  singular thought itself  within the analytic tradition. Insofar as 
the early days of  analytic philosophy can be called a school, one of  the principle tenants of  
this school in practice was that philosophy should methodologically proceed via an analysis 
of  propositions. In seeing the ways that the notion of  singular thought relates to Russellian 
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propositions, and in seeing the way that Russellian propositions relate to the original interests 
of  the pioneers of  analytic philosophy, we can come to see the sense in which an inquiry into 
the existence and/or nature of  singular thought is relevant to the discipline in a broader 
sense. Lastly, the present dissertation is a defence of  Gareth Evans’ theory of  singular 
thought. Evans’ position not only presupposes a prior familiarity with Frege and Russell’s 
positions in their respective details, but his own position involves an ingenious synthesis of  
various elements from both Frege and Russell. 
 Influenced by the crises in the foundations of  mathematics that occurred throughout 
the nineteenth century, Frege and Russell were both motivated to pioneer and develop their 
respective logicist programs. Simply put, the logicist attempts to demonstrate via the (then) 
newly found predicate calculus that the truths of  arithmetic can be wholly derived from a 
purely logical notion of  number and a small set of  logical axioms. Kantian, Hegelian, and 
Millian variations of  idealism were the norms of  the late nineteenth century, and it was 
against the background of  these idealist philosophies and their related accounts of  the 
foundations of  mathematics and logic that both Russell and Frege were motivated to adopt 
their anti-psychologistic stance and make the move towards what they considered a more 
palatable and rigorous logical and mathematical realism. This move towards an anti-
psychologistic realism goes hand in hand with the development of  their logicist programs, 
since according to both thinkers it is paramount that we distinguish logical content (and, ipso 
facto arithmetic itself, qua the logicist program) from any psychological elements, since the 
truths of  logic are to be taken as objective and mind independent. For example, as Russell 
states in Philosophy of  Mathematics (1903):  
 To have meaning, it seems to me, is a notion confusedly compounded of  logical and   
 psychological elements. Words all have meaning, in the simple sense that they are   
 symbols which stand for something other than themselves. But a proposition, unless   
 it happens to be linguistic, does not itself  contain words: it contains the entities   
 indicated by words. Thus meaning, in the sense in which words have meaning, is   
 irrelevant to logic. (47)  
Similarly, in his introduction to The Foundations of  Arithmetic (1884), we find Frege claiming as 
one of  his three fundamental principles the thesis that we always need to “separate sharply 
the psychological from the logical, the subjective from the objective” (x). Russell and Frege 
argue that in failing to distinguish the logical from the psychological their idealist opponents 
had been led to posit metaphysically obscure and fundamentally flawed accounts of  the 
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nature of  arithmetical and logical truth — e.g., Kant’s analysis of  arithmetic as a subset of  
synthetic a priori knowledge.  
 How do Frege and Russell attempt to keep the subjective and objective separated 
during their logical investigations? First, they posit that the act of  an assertion is itself  a very 
different thing than its content — i.e., what is asserted. When I assert that 2 is an even 
number, I assert the content 2 is an even number.  I do not assert the idea that 2 is a number, 9
even though I may have such an idea. Second, this content is to be understood as an objective 
content, something Russell labelled a proposition, while Frege, rather confusingly, used the 
German expression Gedanke, often translated as ‘Thought’.  Russell’s propositions and 10
Frege’s Thoughts served similar functions: both were taken to be the contents of  what was 
asserted, what was believed, what was either communicated or lost in translation, and so on. 
Propositions were conceived of  as objective mind independent entities, the truth of  which 
depended on nothing mental.  
 These pursuits into the foundation of  mathematics led both Frege and Russell to 
consider propositions as a means through which to advance their logicist programs against 
the idealist tendencies of  their day. In order to provide a thorough analysis of  mathematics 
and the propositions of  mathematics, they were driven deeper into questions and concerns 
of  a more semantical character: What is the nature of  reference/aboutness? What is the 
relationship between truth and language? Is truth a property or something entirely different? 
What is the nature of  Meaning, and, more importantly, is there an important respect in 
which the psychological sense of  Meaning ought to be demarcated from the logical sense?  11
These are the precise kinds of  questions we see Russell and Frege addressing in their 
correspondence between 1902 and 1904. In order to answer them, they both posited a 
 This is, of  course, an oversimplification. But for our present purposes it should suffice. 9
 The German word ‘Gedanke’ is often translated as ‘Thought’ with a capital ’T’ so as to indicate its intention as 10
a term of  art.
 It is important at this stage to point out that we ought not anachronistically read our understanding of  11
semantics back into Russell and Frege. However, it is certainly true that the questions they pursued were of  a 
general semantical character even by modern standards. In the history of  analytic philosophy, Frege and Russell 
are often characterized as belonging to the period now known as Ideal Language Analysis, since they are 
concerned not as much with natural language and its numerous ‘imperfections’ (as they would characterize 
them), but rather in the nature and structure of  these objective entities, propositions, with which they were 
concerned with analyzing. Due to Frege and Russell’s overarching goal of  justifying their respective logicist 
programmes their emphasis is on formal languages first and foremost, and, as a result, they are apt to talk of  
language as something primarily formal and abstract, akin to the predicate calculus with which they were 
engaged with. Within such a mindset, it is easy to talk about sentences expressing propositions rather than 
utterances. For a contemporary audience, however, thinking of  utterances as the primary vehicles for the 
expression of  propositions makes more sense.  
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structured propositionalism — that is, an account where propositions are to be considered as 
structured complexes themselves containing simpler constituents. According to Russell 
(1903), propositions are complexes of  concepts (properties and relations) and things/objects, 
while for Frege (1892, 1918) they are complexes of  senses. Although they both posited a 
structured propositionalism for similar needs, this is where the similarities end and the 
differences begin between Frege and Russell. They were both logicists arguing for a type of  
propositional realism and anti-psychologism, but it is in the details of  how they developed 
their respective propositionalism that the differences become most acute.  
 As their correspondence pertaining to the discovery of  Russell’s Paradox unfolded, 
one of  the topics under discussion became the nature of  judgement, the object of  a 
judgement, and the nature of  this object. Let us proceed by introducing the key passages of  
the correspondence itself, and then continue on by examining in more detail the motivations 
behind Frege and Russell’s respective positions. On November 13th 1904, Frege wrote the 
following to Russell: 
 I agree with you that ‘true’ is not a predicate like ‘green.’ For at bottom, the    
 proposition ‘It is true that 2 + 3 = 5’ says no more than the proposition ‘2 + 3 = 5.’   
 Truth is not a component part of  a thought [Gedanke], just as Mont Blanc with its   
 snowfields is not itself  a component part of  the thought [Gedanke] that Mont Blanc  
 is more than 4000 metres high.  (1980, 163)  12
He then goes on to explain that on his view the Meaning of  a term such as ‘Mont Blanc,’ i.e., 
Mont Blanc itself, is not part of  the sense of  the word, “for then it would also be a 
component part of  the thought [Gedanke]” (163). Frege’s main motivation for thinking that 
Mont Blanc cannot be part of  the proposition is that such a view is susceptible to what has 
come to be known as Frege’s Puzzle — a puzzle derived from an apparent inability to 
substitute coreferential terms salva veritate in certain contexts (more on this below). On 
December 12th of  that year, Russell replies: 
 Concerning sense and meaning, I see nothing but difficulties which I cannot        
 overcome… I  believe that in spite of  all its snowfields Mont Blanc itself  is a   
 component part of  what is actually asserted in the proposition ‘Mont Blanc is more   
 than 4000 metres high.’ We do not assert the thought, for this is a private    
 It should be noted that by “the proposition ‘it is true that 2 + 3 = 5’ says no more than …” Frege really 12
means “the proposition expressed by the sentence ‘It is true that 2 + 2 = 5.’” Unfortunately, the 
correspondence took place in German, and ‘Satz’ is usually rendered as ‘Proposition,’ while ‘Gedanke’ is 
rendered as ‘Thought.’ I would have preferred ‘sentence’ and ‘proposition,’ respectively. 
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 psychological matter: we assert the object of  the thought, and this is, to my mind, a   
 certain complex (an objective proposition, one might say) in which Mont Blanc is   
 itself  a component part. If  we do not admit this, then we get the conclusion that we   
 know nothing at all about Mont Blanc. This is why for me the meaning of  a    
 proposition is not the true, but a certain complex which (in the given case) is true …I 
 see the difference between sense and meaning only in the case of  complexes whose   
 meaning is an object. (169, his italics) 
Russell’s main problem with Frege’s sense/Meaning distinction is epistemically based. If  we 
are to hold that sentences express propositions and these propositions determine Meaning or 
aboutness, then we introduce a tertiary entity between ideas and objects that Russell thinks 
only introduces unnecessary difficulties. For example, Frege never really gets into the 
specifics of  how propositions determine Meaning. As we shall see (see 2.1.2 below), he also 
remains quite ambiguous as to whether or not there can be propositions containing syntactic 
constituents that have no Meaning (e.g., whether or not empty proper names can express a 
sense that itself  does not determine a Meaning). Russell, even prior to the advent of  his 
theory of  descriptions (1905), found these epistemic gaps unpalatable. However, prior to his 
theory of  descriptions he was willing to admit some sort of  distinction between sense and 
Meaning, as indicated in the passage quoted above. Prior to 1905, Russell advocated his 
theory of  denoting complexes, according to which some expressions have both a Meaning 
and a denotation (1903b, 306). Nonetheless, even this distinction between Meaning and 
denotation does not map neatly onto Frege’s distinction between Meaning and sense — 
despite Russell’s indication to the contrary in the quoted passage above. 
 Russell’s insistence that propositions about Mont Blanc directly contain the mountain 
as a constituent is the foundation for subsequent Russellianism(s). Contemporary 
Russellianism is a broad cluster of  views that has grown out of  Russell’s notion that, in a 
certain sense, the Meaning of  a word is the object which the word refers to. The word ‘Mont 
Blanc’ means Mont Blanc. Furthermore, some thoughts are about Mont Blanc in the literal 
sense of  having the mountain itself  as part of  their propositional content. Russell’s theory of  
Meaning is therefore considerably Millian in character (in the Kripkean sense), in the sense 
that in the strict logical notion with which Russell was concerned with what we are talking 
about when discussing Meaning is a words denotation. That being said, the concept of  
denoting had a special theoretical significance for Russell that was foreign to Mill’s (1843) 
own use of  the term ‘denotation’. It was this theoretical use of  denoting that Russell came to 
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reject upon the formulation of  his theory of  descriptions (rather ironically, in a paper called 
‘On Denoting’). 
 For the Russellian, it is a relatively straightforward affair to say what a singular 
thought is: a singular thought is a thought that has as its content a Russellian (or singular) 
proposition. Russellian propositions are complexes which have as their constituents objects 
in addition to properties and relations. Non-Russellian propositions are precisely those 
propositions which are not Russellian, that is, propositions that do not contain objects as 
constituents. When I entertain the Russellian proposition Mont Blanc is 4,000 meters high, I am 
thinking of  Mont Blanc that it is 4,000 meters high. For the Fregean, those who hold that 
propositional contents are senses or modes of  presentation of  objects, it is considerably 
more difficult to state what a singular thought is — especially if  singular thoughts are to be 
conceived of  in a Russellian fashion as containing the objects themselves as propositional 
constituents. If  the Fregean is willing to admit terms that have a sense but no Meaning, then 
it is unclear in what sense thoughts that are genuinely about worldly things differ from 
thoughts that are not (other than in their truth value). This is one of  the reasons why Russell 
states that if  we deny the Russellian conception of  propositions, “then we get the conclusion 
that we know nothing at all about Mont Blanc” (1903b, 169). Gareth Evans (1982) has 
posited a non-orthodox reading of  Frege in which Fregean propositions can be conceived 
along broadly Russellian lines. Evans argued that Frege’s theory entails that there are de re (or 
object dependent) senses. The extent to which this account is ascribable to the historical 
Frege himself  is a matter of  considerable debate (see 2.1.2 below).  
 On the orthodox reading of  Frege, which seems most in line with the passage quoted 
above concerning Mont Blanc, what are the theoretical commitments that are motivating him 
to claim that Mont Blanc is not itself  a part of  the proposition expressed? We have also yet 
to address the epistemic conditions that Russell thinks must be satisfied in order for us to 
entertain Russellian propositions about particular objects. Russell held that we can only think 
about those entities with which we stand in a relation of  acquaintance — i.e., one can only 
know the Meaning of  the words of  which they have stood in the relation of  acquaintance to 
these Meanings themselves, as Russell would put it. Following Russell, the vast majority of  
contemporary analytic philosophers have argued that there is an epistemic constraint, such as 
acquaintance, that needs to be satisfied in order for one to have a singular thought.  Perhaps 13
 See Burge (1977), Lewis (1979), Evans (1982), Bach (1987), and Recanati (1993) for the classic defences of  an 13
acquaintance condition on singular thought. I will address the contemporary conceptions of  epistemic 
constraints on singular thought in more detail throughout Section Two and Section Three.  
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most  interestingly, Russell adhered to a theory of  acquaintance during the period prior to 
the advent of  his theory of  descriptions as well as the period following its development. In 
the years prior to the theory of  descriptions, he demarcated denoting from acquaintance, 
whereas after 1905 he came to reject his theory of  denoting altogether — being replaced by 
his distinction between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description. As he 
developed his notion of  knowledge by description, Russell engaged in what Kaplan (2012) 
has called a ‘resetting of  the parameters’ in regards to the nature and scope of  the things 
with which we are acquainted. In doing so, Russell ipso facto resets the scope of  entities that 
are capable of  being constituents of  propositions: e.g., post-1905, Russell is unable to claim 
that Mont Blanc is a constituent of  Russellian propositions: a claim that strikes many as 
intolerable. In the period during which the correspondence with Frege took place, Russell 
was quite willing to hold that we are acquainted with macroscopic objects such as Mont 
Blanc. However, in formulating his theory of  descriptions as a tool capable of  solving a 
number of  logical puzzles, his theoretical commitments caused him to adopt what Evans 
(1982) has called the Cartesian assumption. After adopting the Cartesian assumption, Russell 
claims that we are not acquainted with ordinary objects and can only know them by 
description. It is the Russell of  1903 that most acquaintance theorists take their lead from, 
finding the Cartesian assumption he adopts after 1905 too unpalatable. It is to these topics 
that we shall now turn.  
     2.1.2 Frege and His Puzzle  
 
In ‘On Sense and Meaning’ (1892), Frege argues for a bifurcation of  his previously 
homogenous notion of  content (Inhalt) into two distinct semantic notions – sense (Sinn) and 
Meaning (Bedeutung).  Although the distinction was first introduced in ‘Function and 14
Concept’ (1891), Frege’s main arguments for the distinction appear subsequently in his 
follow up ‘On Sense and Meaning.’ Frege’s main argument is that without distinguishing the 
sense of  an expression from its meaning two puzzles remain intractable: (1) the puzzle of  
informative identity statements differing in cognitive significance, and (2) a failure in 
substituting coreferential (coextensive) terms salva veritate in intensional (or opaque) contexts. 
 In his Foundations of  Arithmetic (1884), for example, Frege often uses ‘Inhalt’, ‘Sinn’, and ‘Bedeutung’ 14
interchangeably. 
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In what follows, I will briefly outline Frege’s main arguments concerning how his sense/
Meaning distinction is able to accommodate the aforementioned puzzles.  
 At the beginning of  ‘On Sense and Meaning,’ Frege states that “equality gives rise to 
challenging questions which are not altogether easy to answer. Is it a relation? A relation 
between objects, or between names or signs of  objects? In my Begriffsschrift I assumed the 
latter” (157). For example, an equality statement such as a = a seems relatively unproblematic 
and straightforward: it appears to state that an object is identical to itself, and, given an 
acceptance of  Leibniz’s law of  identity, seems knowable a priori. In this sense, it seems 
intuitive to take the relation of  equality to be one that holds between objects. However, 
consider an equality statement such as ‘a = b’, when a and b are, in fact, coextensive. In such 
a statement, it seems less straightforward to take it as a relation between objects, since 
equality statements of  this second sort “often contain very valuable extensions of  our 
knowledge and cannot always be established a priori” (157). Therefore, in his Begriffsschrift 
(1879), Frege opted to “assume the latter,” that is, to consider identity relations to hold 
between the names or signs of  objects, rather than between the objects themselves. This 
metalinguistic solution is attractive, as it suggests that in assessing relations of  the sort a = b 
(when true), the relation that is asserted is “that the signs or names ‘a’ and ‘b’ designate the 
same thing, so that those signs themselves would be under discussion” (157). This explains 
why an identity statement such as a = b can be informative, because rather than merely 
asserting that an object is identical to itself, it asserts that ‘a’ and ‘b’ are coreferential 
expressions.  
 However, in ‘On Sense and Meaning’ Frege rejects his earlier Begriffsschrift solution, 
claiming that it gets the subject matter of  statements wrong, as identity statements of  the 
sort a = b are not merely meant to inform our interlocutors that the signs are coreferential, 
but that the objects talked about, the subject matter of  our discourse, are in fact one and the 
same. Therefore, in making an identity statement such as ‘Hesperus is identical to 
Phosphorus,’ the relation is held to hold between the objects the evening star and the 
morning star. Consequently, in order to (a) maintain the proper subject matter of  our 
discourse, and (b) account for the informativeness of  many identity statements, Frege 
suggests that “It is natural, now, to think of  there being connected with a sign (name, 
combination of  words, written mark), besides that to which the sign designates, which may 
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be called the Meaning of  the sign, also what I should like to call the sense of  the sign, wherein 
the mode of  presentation is contained” (158, his italics).  15
 By introducing his distinction between sense and Meaning, which amounts to a 
bifurcation in the the content of  our expressions, Frege is able to maintain that although 
‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ are coreferential expressions designating the same object 
(namely, Venus), an identity relation asserted to hold between them (or rather, it) can be 
informative because of  the different senses, or modes of  presentation, associated with 
‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus.’ Whereas the name ‘Hesperus’ may be associated with the sense 
the evening star, ‘Phosphorus’ may be associated with the sense the morning star. As a result of  
expressing different senses, these names differ in their cognitive value: explaining how 
‘Hesperus is identical to Phosphorus’ is (potentially) more informative and a posteriori, while 
‘Venus is identical to Venus’ appears merely tautological and therefore a priori. This is how 
Frege’s distinction accounts for the first puzzle pertaining to the informativeness of  identity 
statements while nevertheless avoiding his previously metalinguistic solution and satisfying 
our intuitions regarding the proper subject matter of  such identity statements.  
 In order to solve the second puzzle concerning an apparent inability to substitute 
coextensive terms salva veritate in intensional contexts, Frege makes a number of  ingenious 
maneuvers. First, he extends his sense/Meaning distinction from expressions such as proper 
names to include declarative sentences as well (one example of  the remarkable homogeneity 
found within Frege’s systematic theory of  language). According to Frege, such sentences 
express Thoughts, which he clarifies as being “not the subjective performance of  thinking 
but its objective content, which is capable of  being the common property of  several 
thinkers” (162n7). Such Thoughts were characterized in the previous section as Fregean 
propositions. Frege argues that if  we substitute a proper name within a declarative sentence 
with another that designates the same Meaning while nonetheless expressing a different 
sense, then, in ordinary non-intensional contexts, the overall Meaning of  the sentence does 
not change. However, since the same person could simultaneously take one of  the Thoughts 
expressed to be true while taking the other to be false, then the Thoughts must have 
something that distinguishes them besides their Meaning in order for this difference in 
 It is important to note that although the German word ‘Eiganname’ is often translated as ‘proper name,’ 15
Frege used the term in an unusually broad sense for anything “if  it is a sign for an object” (1892b). Definite 
descriptions would likewise be considered as proper names for Frege, on this reading. Perhaps most 
surprisingly, since Frege takes The True and The False to be objects designated by declarative sentences, he also 
considers them to be proper names (see 1892a 163). 
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cognitive significance to be accounted for. Frege posits that for these reasons we should take 
the Thoughts expressed themselves as the senses of  declarative sentences. He then urges that 
it is only when we are concerned with the truth value of  the Thought expressed that we 
inquire into the Meaning or Bedeutung. For this reason, he thinks that it is natural to take two 
binary truth values, The True and the False, to be the Meanings of  declarative sentences. 
Second, by introducing the sense/Meaning distinction at the level of  sentences, Frege then 
accounts for the puzzle concerning intensional contexts by suggesting that when they occur 
as subordinate clauses themselves, e.g., in the context of  ascribing propositional attitudes, the 
Thought usually expressed by the subordinate clause is, in that special context, the Meaning 
of  the overall clause. 
 For example, consider the following argument: 
 (1) Frege believes that Hesperus is dim    
 (2) Hesperus is identical to Phosphorus  
 (2*) Frege does not know that Hesperus is identical to Phosphorus (implicit premise)  
 (3) Therefore, Frege believes that Phosphorus is dim (given substitutivity principle)  
In a possible world in which (1) and (2) are both true, this nevertheless seems like an invalid 
inference, given (2*). Contrast the above argument with the following:  
 (4) Hesperus is dim 
 (5) Hesperus is identical to Phosphorus  
 (6) Therefore, Phosphorus is dim  
Our intuitions here most likely tell us that this is indeed a valid inference from (4) and (5). 
Therefore, in intensional contexts such as those containing propositional attitude verbs like 
‘believes’, the principle of  substitutivity pertaining to coextensive expressions seems to 
violate intuitions concerning argument validity.  
 In order to maintain the principle of  substitutivity, Frege draws a distinction between 
the customary sense/Meaning of  an expression, and the indirect sense/Meaning of  an 
expression. The indirect Meaning of  an expression is its customary sense. Frege maintains 
that in intensional contexts, the expressions occurring within the scope of  the ‘that’-clause 
have as their indirect Meaning their customary sense. This allows Frege to maintain that in 
intensional contexts, the principle of  substitutivity of  coreferential expressions is not 
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violated, instead there occurs a shift in an expressions Meaning.  Let us reconstruct the 16
previously invalid argument above now utilizing Frege’s notion of  indirect Meaning: 
 (7) Frege believes that the evening star is dim  
 (8) The sense of  ‘Hesperus’ (i.e., the evening star) is not identical to the sense of  
 ‘Phosphorus’ (i.e., the morning star) 
 (9) — ?  
By suggesting that in intensional contexts expressions, such as ‘Hesperus’, no longer refer to 
their customary Meanings (in this case, Venus), but instead to their customary sense (in this 
case, the evening star), Frege effectively blocks the opportunity to exploit the principle of  
substitutivity to construct invalid arguments such as (1)-(3) above. Therefore, coreferential 
terms are substitutable salva veritate in all contexts, but expressions which are normally 
coreferential undergo a shift in Meaning in apparently intensional contexts – allowing Frege 
to overcome the second puzzle as well as the first.  
 In addition to utilizing his bifurcation of  his sense/Meaning distinction to offer a 
solution to Frege’s Puzzle, Frege also indicates in several places that it is capable of  dealing 
with issues pertaining to empty names and names occurring in fictional discourse. In works 
of  fiction, poems, and plays, it is common to use names that have no actual Meaning, e.g., 
uses of  the name ‘Odysseus’ throughout Homer’s Odyssey. On any Millian theory of  naming, 
according to which the meaning, or semantic content, of  a name is the object itself, such 
uses of  non-referring names seem particularly puzzling. Insofar as we follow the tradition of  
translating ‘Bedeutung’ as ‘Meaning,’ then in this sense Frege is remarkably Millian — if  it were 
not for the fact that post-1892 he posits senses as an additional type of  content. Armed with 
his theory of  sense, Frege can claim that in uses of  fictional or empty names, though the 
name has no meaning, it still expresses a content as it nevertheless possesses a sense (163). In 
fact, Frege even claims that “it would be desirable to have a special term for signs intended 
to have only sense” (163n8).  
 In his posthumously published ‘Introduction to Logic’ (1906), Frege reiterates his 
 Consider the following passage from Frege (1892): 16
 That in the cases of  the first kind the meaning of  the subordinate clause is in fact the thought can also 
 be recognized by seeing that it is indifferent to the truth of  the whole whether the subordinate clause   
 is true or false…One has the right to conclude only that the meaning of  a sentence is not always its   
 true value, and that ‘morning star’ does not always stand for the planet Venus, viz. when the word has   
 its indirect meaning. An exception of  such a kind occurs in the subordinate clause just considered,   
 which has a thought as its meaning. (166)
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position concerning whether or not Mont Blanc is a constituent of  the thoughts sentences 
express:  
 Proper names designate objects, and a singular thought is about objects. But we can’t  
 say that an object is part of  a thought as a proper name is part of  the corresponding   
 sentence. Mont Blanc with its masses of  snow and ice is not part of  the thought that  
 Mont Blanc is more than 4000m. high; all we can say is that to the object there   
 corresponds, in a certain way that has yet to be considered, a part of  the thought.   
 (187)  
Frege then elaborates on how the Meaning of  proper names as they occur as constituents of  
a sentence relates to the contribution the names make to the Thought expressed, regardless 
of  whether or not the name is empty:  
 Proper names are meant to designate objects, and we call the object designated by a   
 proper name its meaning. On the other hand, a proper name is a constituent of  a   
 sentence, which expresses a thought. Now what has the object got to do with the   
 thought? We have seen from the sentence ‘Mont Blanc is over 4000 m high’ that it is   
 not part of  the thought. Is then the object necessary at all for the sentence to express 
 a thought? People certainly say that Odysseus is not a historical person, and mean   
 by this contradictory expression that the name ‘Odysseus’ designates nothing, has no  
 meaning. But if  we accept this, we do not on that account deny a thought-content to  
 all sentences of  the Odyssey in which the name ‘Odysseus’ occurs. Let us just imagine   
 that we have convinced ourselves, contrary to our former opinion, that the name 
 ‘Odysseus,’ as it occurs in the Odyssey, does designate a man after all. Would this mean 
 that the sentences containing the name ‘Odysseus’ express different thoughts? I think 
 not. The thoughts would strictly remain the same; they would only be transposed   
 from the realm of  fiction to that of  truth.  So the object designated by a proper   
 name seems to be quite inessential to the thought-content of  a sentence which   
 contains it. (191)  
In claiming that ‘the thoughts would strictly remain the same’ regardless of  whether or not 
the name ‘Odysseus’ is empty or not, Frege seems committed to (a) sentences containing 
empty names being capable of  expressing genuine Thoughts, and, relatedly, (b) it being 
indifferent to the content of  a Thought whether or not the name has a Meaning. Hence, on 
face value, his bifurcation of  content into a sense component and a Meaning component 
seems to account for puzzles concerning so called empty names.  
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 However, it remains a contested issue within the literature on Frege as to (a) whether 
or not the historical Frege actually held that proper names can express senses whilst 
nevertheless not designating a Meaning, and (b) independently of  the views of  the historical 
Frege, whether or not the philosophical system he espoused is capable of  accommodating 
such a view. For example, Gareth Evans (1982) claims that Frege’s “willingness to ascribe 
sense to terms with no semantic value is only dubiously coherent” (9). Evans (1982) and 
McDowell (1984) argue that in several places Frege seems committed to the position that 
only sentences containing proper names with a Meaning are capable of  expressing genuine 
Thoughts. McDowell and Evans argue that in several places Frege seems committed to the 
idea that sentences containing the fictional name ‘Odysseus’ are only capable of  expression 
‘mock,’ as opposed to genuine, Thoughts. Consider the following remarks from Frege’s 
‘Logic’ (1897):  
 Names that fail to fulfill the usual role of  a proper name, which is to name    
 something, may be called mock proper names. Although the tale of  William Tell is a   
 legend and not history and the name ‘William Tell’ is a mock proper name, we cannot 
 deny it a sense … Instead of  speaking of  ‘fiction,’ we could speak of  ‘mock    
 thoughts.’ … The logician does not have to bother with mock thoughts, just as a   
 physicist, who sets out to investigate thunder, will not pay any attention to stage-  
 thunder. When we speak of  thoughts in what follows we mean thoughts proper,   
 thoughts that are either true of  false. (130)  
The stance Frege expresses in this passage sits uneasily with what was previously quoted 
from his ‘Introduction to Logic.’ In the latter, Frege seems quite willing to utilize his 
distinction between the sense and the Meaning of  an expression to account for Thoughts 
expressed by sentences containing empty names — claiming that they are capable of  
expressing genuine Thoughts. However, in ‘Logic,’ Frege seems to consider sentences 
containing empty names as only being capable of  expressing ‘mock thoughts,’ and that such 
Thoughts are not ‘thoughts proper.’ Passages such as those in Frege’s ‘Logic’ support 
Evans’ (1982) reading of  Fregean senses such that Frege’s “willingness to ascribe sense to 
terms with no semantic value is only dubiously coherent.”  
 The notion of  sentences containing empty names being capable of  expressing 
genuine Thoughts also sits uneasily with Frege’s original expositions (albeit brief) of  what 
senses are in ‘On Sense and Meaning’ (1892). For example, Frege states that ‘modes of  
presentation’ are contained within senses (158). It is not entirely clear what Frege meant by 
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this metaphorical notion and how the relation of  ‘containment’ is to be cashed out, but it is 
clear that Frege held that the same object can be ‘presented’ or ‘illuminated’ in multiple ways. 
Frege states: 
 The sense of  a proper name is grasped by everyone who is sufficiently familiar with   
 the language or totality of  designations to which it belongs; but this serves to   
 illuminate only a single aspect of  the thing meant, supposing it to have one.    
 Comprehensive knowledge of  the thing meant would require us to be able to say   
 immediately whether any given sense attaches to it. To such knowledge we never   
 attain. (158, my italics) 
Assuming for a moment that we possess the vantage point of  this omniscient observer that 
Frege describes, we would be able to say which modes of  presentation belong to which 
objects. This suggests a direct link between the objects (or Meanings), which the modes of  
presentation are modes of  presentation of, and the senses wherein these modes of  
presentation are contained. On this reading, it would hardly make sense for Frege to hold 
that empty names are capable of  expressing a sense containing a mode of  presentation of  a 
Meaning that, by definition, does not exist to be presented! As Evans (1982) puts it, “It is 
really not clear how there can be a mode of  presentation associated with some term when 
there is no object to be presented” (22).  
 Evans uses this textual evidence to suggest that in order to charitably reconstruct 
Frege’s ‘official’ position concerning empty names we should take Frege’s talk of  mock 
Thoughts quite seriously. Evans states that “Frege pointed in the direction in which we 
should look for a way of  understanding the case where a singular term is empty, namely as 
involving some sort of  pretence or appearance of  thought-expression rather than the real thing” 
(30, his italics). On this reading, Frege grafted his notion of  sense onto his semantical theory 
as it existed prior to 1892 (when Meaning and sense were used interchangeably by Frege to 
discuss what would strictly become an expressions Meaning after 1892), in order to solve 
puzzles arising from differences in the cognitive significance of  coreferential expressions. 
Evans suggests that overall Frege “departed very little from the ‘Russellian’ model of  the 
functioning of  singular sentences which he had embraced before 1890” (30). According to 
this Russellian model, a term is significant only insofar as it has a referent, or Meaning (12). 
If  this reading of  Frege is correct, then despite the fact that Mont Blanc itself  is not a 
constituent of  Thoughts expressed by sentences containing the name ‘Mont Blanc’, the 
Thoughts themselves are constitutively dependent on Mont Blanc. This would suggest that 
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there may be much less disagreement between Russell and Frege than their initially appears 
to be. On this reading, the Thoughts expressed by sentences containing non-empty singular 
terms would be object dependent in the Russellian vein. However, if  the Orthodox Reading 
of  Frege is correct, according to which it makes sense to ascribe senses to expressions that 
nevertheless fail to have a Meaning, then it seems that Russell’s worry about the epistemic 
gap this opens up remains intractable, for the Thoughts grasped by us about Mont Blanc 
would remain the same regardless of  whether or not ‘Mont Blanc’ were an empty name.  
 Now that we have seen Frege’s original motivations for bifurcating his previously 
homogenous notion of  content, and how he attempts to solve a number of  puzzles with his 
distinction between sense and Meaning, we now come to the incumbent question as to the 
nature of  Fregean senses. Unfortunately, though Frege has given us brief  explications of  
what senses are, he never really gives a detailed account. Perhaps the most thorough 
treatment is to be found in Frege (1918). He frequently tells us the functions that senses are 
meant to serve, but nevertheless resists ever going into any substantial depth about the 
nature of  senses themselves. Nonetheless, there are several brief  characterizations of  senses 
that Frege provides us with:  
(i) Senses as abstract objects. Perhaps the most metaphysically demanding exposition of  the 
nature of  senses is to be found in Frege (1918). Frege conceives of  senses as imperceptible 
and timelessly true abstract entities that exist in a third realm — distinct from the subjective 
realm of  psychology and its ideas and the perceivably objective realm of  physical objects. 
Such entities are ‘grasped’ by us, but are ontologically independent of  our grasping them. 
This conception, of  course, is open to the objection from causal efficacy. This conception of  
sense is fine and dandy, but leaves it dubiously mysterious as to how we ‘grasp’ such 
timelessly true and imperceptible abstract objects 
 
(ii) Senses as modes of  presentation. During his original exposition of  senses (1892a), Frege 
states that it is natural to think signs are connected to senses, “wherein the mode of  
presentation is contained.” However, Frege does little to aid our understanding of  the sense 
in which the mode of  presentation is contained in the sense of  a sign. As Evans puts it, none 
of  Frege’s various metaphors of  senses as modes of  presentation or as illuminating Meaning 
from different sides “makes the relation between sense and Meaning entirely clear … it 
seems to me to be possible to dispense with them” (1982: 15). As we will see in Chapter 
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Three, Evans attempts to rework aspects of  this way of  conceiving of  senses in his notion 
of  Ideas, or ‘ways of  thinking’ about an object.  
 
(iii) Senses as definite descriptions. In his initial exposition of  what a sense is, Frege included 
a now infamous, and perhaps unfortunate, footnote. In the footnote Frege claims that “in 
the case of  an actual proper name such as ‘Aristotle’ opinions as to the sense may differ. It 
might, for instance, be taken to be the following: the pupil of  Plato and teacher of  Alexander 
the Great” (1892a: 158). Taken in isolation, this footnote strongly suggests that senses are to 
be characterized as definite descriptions. This is the foundation for the descriptivist reading 
of  Frege, a reading that has been variously attributed to Frege, but perhaps no such 
attribution is as famous as Kripke’s (1980). However, there is little textual evidence within 
Frege’s works that suggests he actually held a staunch descriptivist theory of  senses. It is 
more likely that Frege found descriptions to be a helpful way of  helping his audience 
understand the phenomena he was grasping at. Evans (1982) even goes so far as to claim that 
“there is absolutely nothing in the texts to support the claim that he held that the way of  
thinking of  any object must exploit the subject’s knowledge of  some description uniquely 
true of  it” (18). In fact, an aspect of  Evans’ project throughout The Varieties of  Reference is 
investigating the viability of  non-descriptive modes of  presentation.    
(iv) Senses and propositional attitude psychology. As we briefly saw above, the connection 
Frege establishes between the sense expressed by sentences when they occur as subordinate 
clauses, especially within propositional attitude reports, and the cognitive significance that 
they possess for a thinker who grasps the Thought expressed by uses of  such clauses, is 
essential to his own solution to Frege’s Puzzle. Evans (1982) has suggested that although 
Frege’s linking of  senses with the “notions employed in ordinary propositional-attitude 
psychology” does not in itself  explicate the notion of  sense that Frege had in mind, it does 
impose a constraint upon any such conception of  senses (18). Evans has called the link to 
propositional attitude psychology that Frege employed the Intuitive Criterion of  Difference. 
Evans expresses the Intuitive Criterion as follows:  
 The thought associated with one sentence S as its sense must be different from the   
 thought associated with another sense S’ as its sense, if  it is possible for someone to   
 understand both sentences at a given time while coherently taking different attitudes   
 towards them, i.e., accepting (rejecting) one while rejecting (accepting), or being   
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 agnostic about, the other. (1982: 18-19, his italics) 
The Intuitive Criterion serves as a potential method of  individuating senses — at least at a 
preliminary level. These interpretations of  Fregean Sinn have been immensely influential 
within the theory of  reference, the semantics of  names, and the various conceptions of  
singular thought found throughout the literature. Of  particular importance for our purposes 
is the fact that they were formative on the development of  Gareth Evans’ own theory of  
singular thought.  
 
     2.1.3 Russell and His Propositions 
As we saw above, Russell (1903a) argued that propositions are structured complexes 
composed of  more basic constituents — such as objects, properties, and relations. Russellian 
propositions are those that contain objects themselves as constituents. For example, if  I were 
to utter the sentence “Mont Blanc is more than 4,000 meters high,” I would assert a 
Russellian proposition that contains as its constituents the object Mont Blanc and the 
propositional function 4,000 meters high. As we also noted above, Russell takes propositions to 
be the objects of  thought, arguing that it is imperative to distinguish the object/content of  a 
thought from the psychological process of  thinking said thought. Whereas a thought content 
(proposition), can be the property of  several thinkers, a particular instance of  a psychological 
process cannot. For example, in the sense of  thought content, x is able to entertain the same 
thought as y, whereas in the sense of  thought process, it seems highly improbable that y’s 
process of  thinking can be possessed by x in the requisite sense.  
 Although Russell thinks that thought contents are sharable, he holds that there are 
constraints on which thoughts any particular thinker is able to entertain. Russell argues that 
there is an epistemic constraint governing whether or not any given thinker is able to 
understand or entertain a particular proposition, or thought content. He also holds that there 
are instances in which it may appear as if  a given sentence expresses a Russellian proposition 
containing an object as a constituent when it, in fact, does not. Interestingly, these two 
points, (1) that there is an epistemic constraint governing the understanding of  propositions, 
and (2) that the surface grammar of  a sentence is misleading in regards to the propositional 
content that it expresses, were maintained by Russell even after he formulated his infamous 
theory of  descriptions (1905) and rejected his earlier (1903) theory of  denoting. The primary 
difference is that after rejecting his theory of  denoting, Russell eventually adapted a stricter 
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notion of  the kind of  objects with which we are acquainted (something Kaplan has called a 
resetting of  the parameters of  acquaintance), and he also rejected the notion that descriptive 
phrases are capable of  contributing an object to the proposition expressed. Instead, qua his 
theory of  descriptions, Russell took descriptive phrases to express quantificational 
propositional contents, while only what he called ‘logically proper names’ (e.g., 
demonstratives such as ‘this’ and ‘that’) were capable of  being used to express genuine 
Russellian (or object dependent) propositions.  
 Russell’s resetting of  the parameter as to both (a) the scope of  the objects of  
acquaintance, and (b) the linguistic means of  contributing such objects to the propositions 
expressed, was largely due to what Evans (1982) has called Russell’s Cartesian Assumption: 
which is, roughly, the notion that if  someone takes themselves to be entertaining a genuine 
thought about some particular object, then they cannot be mistaken (see Evans 1982). 
Russell’s Cartesian Assumption is at least partially a consequence of  his attempt to make his 
theory of  descriptions applicable to Frege’s Puzzle insofar as it involves ordinary proper 
names. It is the way that Russell tries to amalgamate his Cartesian Assumption with his own 
earlier (1903) thoughts about acquaintance and Russellian propositions that makes his theory 
of  acquaintance seem unpalatable to a contemporary audience.  
 Since Russell’s (1903) theory of  denoting and his (1905 and subsequent) reasons for 
rejecting it have been tremendously influential on the subsequent reference and singular 
thought literature, it will do us well to examine them. According to Russell (1903), someone 
is able to entertain a proposition only if  they are acquainted with the constituents/Meanings 
of  the proposition. In the posthumously published ‘Points About Denoting’ (1903b), Russell 
states that “it is necessary, for the understanding of  a proposition, to have acquaintance with 
the meaning of  every constituent of  the meaning” (307, his italics).  For example, the 17
Meaning of  ‘Mont Blanc’ is the actual mountain in the alps, while the Meaning of  ‘4,000 
meters tall’ is the property of  being 4,000 meters tall. Assuming I am acquainted with both 
the object and the property in this particular case, then Russell would hold that I am able to 
understand the proposition [itself  a Meaning, namely the mind independent proposition 
itself] Mont Blanc is 4,000 meters high. Russell thinks that an expression’s Meaning, our 
acquaintance with its Meaning, and our ability to successfully communicate its Meaning are 
notions that are intimately interrelated. Consider the following passage from ‘On Meaning 
 Unfortunately, prior to 1905, Russell offers little insight in terms of  what constitutes standing in an 17
acquaintance relation to an object.
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and Denotation’ (1903c):  
 If  we say, for instance, “Arthur Balfour advocates retaliation,” that expresses a   
 thought which has for its object a complex containing as a constituent the man   
 himself; no one who does not know what is the designation of  the name “Arthur   
 Balfour” can understand what we mean: the object of  our thought cannot, by our   
 statement, be communicated with him. But when we say “the present Prime Minister  
 of  England believes in retaliation,” it is possible for a person to understand    
 completely what we mean without his knowing that Mr. Arthur Balfour is Prime   
 Minister, and indeed without his ever having heard of  Mr.Arthur. On the other hand, 
 if  he does not know what England is, or what we mean by present, or what it is to be   
 Prime Minister, he cannot understand what we mean. This shows that Mr. Arthur   
 Balfour does not form part of  our meaning, but that England and the present and   
 being Prime Minister do form part of  it. Thus the meaning of  the two propositions is  
 different: a man may know either without knowing or even understanding the   
 other. (315-316, his italics)  18
In this example, Russell thinks that although we may know who Arthur Balfour is, that is, we 
know the Meaning of  ‘Arthur Balfour,’ if  our interlocutor does not know who Arthur 
Balfour is, then they are unable to understand the proposition we express in saying “Arthur 
Balfour believes in retaliation.” However, she may nevertheless be capable of  understanding 
the proposition expressed by the sentence “The present [in 1903] Prime Minister of  England 
believes in retaliation,” even if  the denoting phrase ‘the present Prime Minister of  England’ 
and the proper name ‘Arthur Balfour’ appear to be about the same object, namely, Arthur 
Balfour. Russell’s reasoning is that although she may not be acquainted with Arthur Balfour, 
the Meaning of  ‘Arthur Balfour,’ she may nevertheless be acquainted with the cluster of  
concepts that make up the denoting phrase ‘the present Prime Minister of  England.’  
 According to Russell’s theory of  denoting, certain clusters of  words within a 
language that he called ‘denoting phrases’ (or, alternatively, ‘descriptive phrases’) possess a 
peculiar property he called denoting. According to Russell (1903a): 
 A concept denotes when, if  it occurs in a proposition, the proposition is not about the   
 concept, but about a term connected in a certain peculiar way with the concept. If  I   
 say, “I met a man,” the proposition is not about a man: this is a concept which does   
 It is perhaps worth noting that the criterion for individuating Meanings presented here is remarkably similar 18
to Frege’s method of  individuating senses via the Intuitive Criterion of  Difference.
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 not walk the streets, but lives in the shadowy limbo of  logic-books. What I met was a 
 thing, not a concept, an actual man with a tailor and a bank-account or a public-  
 house and a drunken wife. (53) 
According to the theory of  denoting, in the case of  phrases such as ‘a woman,’ ‘the so-and-
so,’ ‘some woman,’ etc., we need to distinguish between the Meaning of  the expression and 
its denotation (1903b, 306). Russell states that: 
 A phrase such as “the present Prime Minister of  England” designates an entity, in this   
 case Mr.Arthur Balfour, while it expresses a meaning, which is complex, and does not,   
 as a rule, include the entity designated as a constituent; the relation of  the meaning   
 expressed to the entity designated is that of  denoting. The meaning may be called a   
 description of  the entity, and the phrase may be called a descriptive phrase. (1903c, 318,   
 his italics) 
According to Russell, a descriptive phrase such as ‘the present Prime Minister of  England’ 
expresses a complex Meaning insofar as it contains parts, while its denotation is simple: 
namely, Arthur Balfour (1903b, 306). In this sense, ‘The present [in 1903] Prime Minister of  
England believes in retaliation’ expresses a proposition that does not contain Arthur Balfour 
as a constituent, but instead contains the denoting complex expressed by the denoting 
phrase. According to Russell’s own taxonomy of  propositions, such a proposition would not 
be considered properly Russellian, since it contains a denoting complex as a constituent 
instead of  the denoted object itself. Our ability to denote objects without being acquainted 
with them is achieved through the use of  descriptive phrases (306). For example, Russell says 
that “given a particular class, e.g., the Solar System, we infer that it has one centre of  mass; 
thus we can denote the centre of  mass in question, without being acquainted with it” (306). 
This is the sense in which Russell is willing to agree with Frege that in some instances he is 
able to see “the difference between sense and meaning only in the case of  complexes whose 
meaning is an object” (Frege, 1980, 169). It is unclear, however,  whether or not Russell 
realized that his distinction between Meaning and denotation does not map neatly onto 
Frege’s distinction between sense and Meaning. 
 There are a number of  important caveats to Russell’s theory of  denoting. First, 
Russell says that “a proposition will only be said to be about a term [object] if  that term 
[object] is a constituent of  the denotation” (1903b, 307, his italics). Russell elaborates: 
 …If  I ask: Is Smith married? and the answer is affirmative, I then know that “Smith’s 
 wife” is a denoting phrase, although I don’t know who Smith’s wife is. We may   
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 distinguish the terms with which we are acquainted from others which are merely   
 denoted. E.g., in the above case, I am supposed to be acquainted with the term Smith  
 and the relation marriage, and thence to be able to conceive a term having this relation 
 to Smith, although I am not acquainted with any such term. (306, his italics) 
Here Russell draws a sharp distinction between those objects with which are are acquainted 
and those which we reach only through the logical property of  denoting. This is his 
explanation as to why the locution ‘Smith’s wife’ may be a meaningful phrase even if  one does 
not know who Smith’s wife actually is. If  one knows that Smith’s wife is Triphena, that is, if  
one is acquainted with Triphena, then all the merrier, for then they are able to grasp the 
Russellian proposition that contains Triphena herself  — otherwise, they grasp the 
proposition containing the denoting complex itself.  
 The second main caveat of  Russell’s theory of  denoting is that he questions the 
homogeneity of  what Evans (1982) has since called the intuitive category of  referential 
expressions (or singular terms). As we saw in the above section on Frege, Frege’s theory of  
language was remarkably homogenous. Words, sentences, etc., are all said to express senses 
and designate Meanings. Frege’s semantics of  sense and Meaning is able to treat sentences, 
definite descriptions, proper names, demonstratives, and so on in a homogenous manner 
because Frege considers each of  these expressions as as belonging to his technical category 
of  Proper Names (Eiganname). However, for Russell, it turns out that descriptive phrases and 
proper names semantically behave in ways that bear little resemblance to one another. The 
Russell of  1903 takes a staunchly Millian stance on the Meaning of  proper names: if  there is 
no object, then there is no Meaning. If  there is a Meaning, there must be an object. 
Furthermore, to know this Meaning, one must be acquainted with it (as he illustrates in the 
quoted passage above). Descriptive phrases, on the other hand, are capable of  being perfectly 
intelligible regardless of  whether or not one is acquainted with the object they denote. This is 
because they express denoting complexes and contribute these complexes to the proposition 
expressed. One can understand a denoting complex without having knowledge of  what it 
denotes, as Russell illustrates in the quoted passage above concerning the centre of  mass in 
the Solar System. Therefore, to tie this in with our previous discussion, so long as both Frege 
and Russell are acquainted with Mont Blanc, they are capable of  successfully communicating 
with one another about Mont Blanc with the name ‘Mont Blanc.’ If  Russell had presumed 
Frege did not know what Mont Blanc was, he could have used the descriptive phrase ‘the 
tallest mountain in the alps’ instead, which would have contributed the denoting complex to 
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the proposition expressed, a complex that would have been perfectly intelligible to Frege 
despite his (in this example) unfamiliarity with Mont Blanc.  
 However, by 1905, Russell had grown dissatisfied with his theory of  denoting, and 
developed his now famous theory of  descriptions. First, whereas in 1903 Russell argued that 
denoting phrases are capable of  contributing denoting complexes to the proposition 
expressed, from 1905 onwards Russell suggests that what descriptive phrases contribute 
propositionally is, in fact, quite different than what is suggested grammatically by a denoting 
phrase. In the theory of  descriptions, denoting complexes disappear altogether upon proper 
semantical analysis of  the propositions that denoting phrases express. Instead, they are taken 
to express quantificational propositions (which purport the unique instantiation of  some 
property in the case of  definite descriptions). Russell’s approach to the analysis of  
propositions became more sophisticated so as to suggest that we must engage in a more 
robust transformative analysis of  sentences to reveal the true logical form of  the proposition 
that they express. That being said, despite the ways in which his theory of  descriptions was a 
rather radical departure from his earlier theory, he carried several aspects of  his earlier theory 
over: the most important being his notion of  acquaintance as a special epistemic constraint 
on which propositions one is capable of  grasping. This brings us to the second major 
departure from his earlier theory of  denoting. Whereas in 1903 Russell seemed happy to 
contrast entities which are merely denoted from those with which we are acquainted, 
post-1905 Russell’s notion of  acquaintance becomes a more fully developed notion that 
serves as the foundation to his theory of  knowledge.  
 Russell’s departure from his theory of  denoting began in (the rather ironically titled) 
‘On Denoting’ (1905), wherein Russell advances his theory of  descriptions, and rejects his 
earlier theory of  denoting, for two main reasons.  First, the theory is able to dismantle a 19
number of  otherwise philosophically perplexing puzzles without the need to posit non-
existent Meinongian objects or Fregean senses (i.e., it is ontologically parsimonious). Second, 
the theory explains how we are able to have knowledge of  things beyond the objects with 
which we are immediately acquainted (i.e., it is epistemically fruitful). However, prior to 
 It should perhaps be noted that although prior to his theory of  descriptions Russell often used the locutions 19
‘descriptive phrase’ and ‘denoting phrase’ interchangeably, beginning in 1905, his use of  ‘denoting phrase’ 
begins to fade out of  use altogether. The reason is likely that his previous use of  the locution ‘denoting phrase’ 
too heavily suggests the logical property of  denoting — the very thing that Russell abandoned following the 
development of  his theory of  descriptions.
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considering any of  these phenomena in any detail, I will briefly outline Russell’s treatment of  
descriptions more generally.   20
 Russell is concerned with descriptions such as ‘the Present King of  France,’ ‘a man’, 
‘the first person born in the twentieth century,’ etc. Some descriptions are ambiguous, or 
indefinite, and usually are of  the form ‘a-so-and-so,’ while others are definite, and of  the 
form ‘the-so-and-so.’ Grammatically, indefinite and definite descriptions alike often occur in 
the subject position of  a sentence, such as ‘the Present King of  France is bald.’ Hence, 
descriptions superficially appear as if  they should be analyzed in a way similar to other 
linguistic expressions capable of  occupying similar grammatical positions. Frege (1892), as 
we saw above, assimilates definite descriptions into his category of  Proper Names 
(Eiganname), and treats them as singular terms that express a sense which determines a 
Meaning. Russell (1905), on the other hand, thinks that expressions such as ‘the Present King 
of  France’ are actually disguised quantificational phrases. At the level of  logical form, 
descriptions function quite differently than their grammatical form suggests. According to 
Russell, a phrase such ‘all humans are mortal’ means  ; or in natural language 
(pretending algebraic variables frequently occur in uses of  natural language) , if  x is human 
then x is mortal. Likewise, although the phrase ‘the Present King of  France is bald’ intuitively 
suggests the following logical form,  , where B is the property of  being bald and a is the 
object denoted by ‘the Present King of  France,’ Russell suggests that it ought to be analyzed 
as a quantificational expression as well, namely,  ; or in 
natural language, roughly, there is exactly one x such that x is King of  France and x is bald. Notice 
that in these logical constructions the definite article ‘the’ is eliminated, and only a bound 
variable occurs instead of  an object proper. It subsequently makes no sense to ask for the 
Meaning of  ‘the present King of  France’ in isolation from the sentence in which it occurs, as 
the function of  this phrase, what it ultimately contributes to the proposition expressed by the 
sentence of  which it is a syntactic constituent, is not a grammatical nor a logical subject (or 
object), but rather a quantificational phrase that specifies the existence of  some unique 
object satisfying a number of  properties. Likewise, a sentence such as ‘the present King of  
∀x (Hx ⊃ Mx)
Ba
∃x (Fx ∧ ( ∀y)(F y ⊃ x = y) ∧ Bx)
 Much of  my outline of  Russell’s theory of  descriptions will follow the general approach and terminology that 20
he adopts in his Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy (1919). The reason for this, is that ‘On Denoting’ is riddled 
with terminological confusions and misleading uses of  the term ‘denoting phrase’ and ‘meaning’ or ‘mean,’ – 
often at the detriment of  making a thorough engagement with that work a rather daunting exegetical exercise 
more aptly suited for an exploration in the history of  analytic philosophy proper. For our present purposes, that 
of  outlining the theory of  definite descriptions first introduced in ‘On Denoting,’ adopting the clearer 
exposition of  Russell (1919) is more beneficial. 
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France is bald’ is no longer taken as a containing a denoting phrase that expresses a denoting 
complex, since at the level of  logical form the proposition expressed does not contain a man 
(e.g., Louis the XIV if  it were uttered in 1700) as a correlate to the phrase ‘a man.’ 
 Russell (1919) claims that a “theory may be tested by its capacity for dealing with 
puzzles, and it is a wholesome plan, in thinking about logic, to stock the mind with as many 
puzzles as possible, since these serve much the same purpose as is served by experiments in 
physical science” (108). Russell’s utilizes his theory of  descriptions to solve five different 
puzzles, puzzles that he largely inherited from Frege (1892) and Meinong (1904). The puzzles 
are as follows: 
 (1) Informative identity statements  
 (2) Failure of  the substitution of  coreferential  expressions in certain contexts  
 (3) The problem of  empty names / descriptions  
 (4) Law of  the excluded middle  
 (5) True negative existential statements  
As we saw above, Frege attempted to solve puzzles (1) through (3) by positing senses in 
addition to Meanings. However, in certain contexts Frege’s theory violates the law of  the 
excluded middle – namely, whenever an empty name occurs in a sentence, as for Frege the 
Meaning of  a complete declarative sentence is determined by the Meaning of  its parts. Given 
that the sentence ‘Odysseus was set ashore at Ithaca’ contains the name ‘Odysseus,’ which 
expresses a sense, but fails to determine a Meaning, it follows that the sentence as a whole 
lacks a truth value, since the referent of  a declarative sentence is either the True or the False. 
Meinong, on the other hand, attempted to account for puzzles (3) through (5) by claiming 
that every denoting phrase denotes, even if  it denotes a non-existent object. Russell’s earlier 
theory of  denoting also commits him to a similar position as Meinong, for if  a denoting 
phrase has Meaning it expresses a denoting complex, and on Russell’s earlier theory it is 
difficult to see how a denoting complex would have Meaning if  it itself  does not denote. As 
Russell (1905) himself  puts it, “One of  the first difficulties that confronts us, when we adopt 
the view that denoting phrases express a meaning and denote a denotation, concerns the cases 
in which the denotation appears to be absent” (46, his italic). In addition to being 
ontologically bloated, Meinongian theories purportedly violate the law of  non contradiction, 
as the descriptive phrase ‘the round square’ denotes the round square, since every denoting 
phrase denotes for Meinong (1904). Russell came to consider these results intellectually 
insufferable, and seems to have found his newfound theory’s ability to handle puzzles (1) 
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through (5) without the need to posit any extra entities or violate any logical laws one of  its 
chief  merits.  
 Consider Frege’s Puzzle, which, as we saw above, is the apparent inability to 
substitute coreferential expressions salva veritate in certain contexts. Frege attempted to solve 
this puzzle by positing senses in addition to Meanings. However, in order to handle this 
puzzle amongst others without positing any additional entities or semantic types, Russell 
suggests that there is a difference between primary (wide scope) and secondary (narrow scope) 
occurrences of  definite descriptions. On this account, ‘Frege believes that the evening star is 
dim’ can either be represented with narrow scope as (i) or with wide scope as (ii) : 
 (i) Frege believes:   
or 
 (ii)  : Frege believes   
Let us consider (i). (i) contains the property being the first heavenly body visible in the evening but 
this property is not the same as the property being the first heavenly body visible in the morning so 
the expressions are not coreferential and the puzzle cannot even get off  the ground. This is 
just one example of  how Russell’s theory of  descriptions is surprisingly powerful and capable 
of  solving a number of  logical puzzles, including (1) through (5) listed above. 
 Despite the fact that Russell replaced his theory of  denoting with his theory of  
descriptions, his earlier notion of  acquaintance continued to serve a prominent role overall. 
By this stage, Russell defined acquaintance as having a “direct cognitive relation to that 
object, i.e. when I am directly aware of  the object itself ” (1910, 108). Furthermore, Russell 
claims that: 
 The fundamental principle in the analysis of  propositions containing descriptions is   
 this: Every proposition which we can understand must be composed wholly of    
 constituents with which we are acquainted… it is scarcely conceivable that we can make a   
 judgment or entertain a supposition without knowing what it is that we are judging or supposing   
 about. We must attach some meaning to the words we use, if  we are to speak    
 significantly and not utter mere noise; and the meaning we attach to our words must   
 be something with which we are acquainted. (1912, 32, my italics) 
The italicized portion is what Evans (1982) has labelled ‘Russell’s Principle,’ and, as we shall 
in Chapter Three, one of  the main aims throughout Evans’ The Varieties of  Reference is a 
sustained defence of  the application of  this principle. The importance of  the principle for 
Russell is that it provided the basis for his foundationalist epistemology. Although all 
∃x (Ex ∧ ( ∀y)(My ⊃ x = y) ∧ Dx)
∃x (Ex ∧ ( ∀y)(My ⊃ x = y) (Dx)
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knowledge is grounded in acquaintance, the importance of  knowledge by description is that 
it enables us to “pass beyond the limits of  our private experience” and think about things 
with which we have no acquaintance (32).   21
 It seems as if  instead of  his theory of  acquaintance being a consequence of  his theory 
of  descriptions, or something that originated and developed alongside it, that it was an aspect 
from his earlier period/his theory of  denoting that he carried over post-1905, despite the fact 
he categorically rejects the theory of  denoting. Consider these two passages from ‘On 
Denoting’ (1905), both of  which are worth quoting at length to illustrate this point:  
 The subject of  denoting is of  very great importance, not only in logic and    
 mathematics, but also in theory of  knowledge. For example, we know that the centre  
 of  mass of  the solar system at a definite instant is some definite point, we can affirm  
 a number of  propositions about it; but we have no immediate acquaintance with this   
 point, which is only known to us by description. The distinction between acquaintance  
 and knowledge about is the distinction between the things we have presentations of, and 
 the things we only reach by means of  denoting phrases. (41, his italics) 
and,  
 One interesting result of  the above theory of  denoting  is this: when there is   22
 anything with which we do not have immediate acquaintance, but only definition by   
 denoting phrases, then the propositions in which this thing is introduced by means   
 of  a denoting phrase do not really contain this thing as a constituent, but contain   
 instead the constituents expressed by several of  the words of  the denoting phrase.   
 Thus in every proposition that we can apprehend (i.e., not only in those whose truth   
 or falsehood we can judge of, but in all that we can think about), all the constituents   
 are really entities with which we have immediate acquaintance. (55-56)  
Each of  these quoted passages would have been as happily at home contained within 
Russell’s Principles of  Mathematics (1903) as they would have been post 1905. Of  course, part 
of  this is due to the fact that Russell is still using the locution ‘denoting phrase’ in 1905, 
which is a misnomer on his part, since he is, in fact, rejecting the theory of  denoting. 
However, despite this rather misleading mistake of  his, what he says about the role of  
acquaintance remains rather untouched despite the fact he had replaced his theory of  
 Throughout the years Russell often changed his mind as to which things we are acquainted with – although 21
the list typically includes sense data, universals, our own mental states, and perhaps ourselves. 
 Think: theory of  descriptions here. It is a bit of  a misnomer that Russell is still using the locution ‘theory of  22
denoting’ to describe his view by this point in the paper — since he has rejected that theory.
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denoting with his theory of  descriptions.  
 So, if  Russell’s theory of  descriptions serves a similar role epistemically as his theory 
of  denoting, then what is so significant about it? Well, the fact that the theory of  
descriptions is capable of  handling a number of  logical puzzles that the theory of  denoting 
cannot. But the epistemic role that the theory of  descriptions serves is not one of  the 
benefits that Russell gained in rejecting his earlier theory of  denoting, it is simply a benefit of  
the theory of  denoting that he decided to carry over and add on as an aspect of  his theory 
of  descriptions, or so I have argued. What does this entail about his theory of  acquaintance 
post-1905? It suggests that the amendments he made to the theory of  acquaintance were 
made in order for this theory of  descriptions to have the widest possible application. For 
example, one of  the logical puzzles that Russell was attempting to solve was Frege’s Puzzle. 
His theory of  descriptions solves that quite readily as we saw above. But, as Frege noted, the 
puzzle arises just as easily for coreferential proper names as it does for coreferential definite 
descriptions (which are, on Frege’s account, Proper Names as well). Russell likely realized 
that in order to extend the applicability of  his theory of  descriptions era solution to Frege’s 
Puzzle so as to include cases involving proper names, he would have to either (a) reject the 
notion that proper names are capable of  contributing objects to the proposition expressed 
[that is, that the Meaning of  proper names is the object named], or (b) reject that our 
ordinary conception of  proper names is adequate. Russell chose the latter.  
 As such, the notion of  acquaintance continues to function as the metasemantic 
foundation for Russell’s Millian theory of  naming according to which the Meaning of  a name 
is its referent or bearer, as it had in the period through which he subscribed to his theory of  
denoting. On Russell’s account, we are able to name only those objects with which we are 
acquainted. Russell claims that when we are acquainted with an object and use a proper name 
to talk about it, “the proper name has the direct use which it always wishes to have, as simply 
standing for a certain object, and not for a description of  the object” (1912). Any names 
satisfying this function are known as logically proper names according to Russell. However, 
given that during this period Russell (1905-1918, perhaps far later) adhered to an austere 
sense-data theory of  perception, according to which we are never really acquainted with 
macroscopic objects like Mont Blanc, Frege, the external world, or other minds. These 
things, according to Russell, are only knowable via description. As a result, Russell concludes 
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that most of  the ordinary proper names that we use are in fact truncated or disguised 
definite descriptions.  23
  Throughout the remainder of  the dissertation, many of  the technical notions 
developed by Frege and Russell that we have considered will continue to resurface as well as 
providing the theoretical scaffolding for many of  the contemporary debates and positions. In 
the next section, for example, we’ll see that the dominant conception of  singular thought is 
still broadly Russellian in character: singular thought considered as a type of  content. 
Furthermore, the theory of  singular thought that Evans develops throughout The Varieties of  
Reference is not only heavily rooted in both Frege and Russell, but presupposes a great deal of  
familiarity with their works.  
 
 Russell had a number of  epistemological and metaphysical reasons that motivated him to advance this claim. 23
However, for the sake of  brevity I am merely providing an overview. 
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§II Some Conceptions of Singular Thought  
     2.2.1 Singular Thought as Type of Content 
The overall aim of  the present section is to briefly outline various conceptions of  singular 
thought that have emerged in the philosophical literature. In the previous section, we saw the 
ways in which the technical notion of  a proposition emerged from the writings of  both 
Frege and Russell. Furthermore, we saw two different conceptions of  singular, or object 
dependent, propositions. In our discussion of  Frege, a possible reading of  Fregean Sinn 
emerged according to which they are object dependent modes of  presentation, or de re 
senses.  In Russell, we saw the development of  the notion of  singular propositions, i.e., 24
propositions containing objects as constituents. The key difference between a Fregean and 
Russellian account of  singular propositions is that, for the Russellian, such propositions 
literally contain such individuals, whereas for the de re Fregean, they are merely dependent on 
individuals. Following Frege and Russell, many theorists have continued to think of  singular 
thoughts along broadly propositional lines as thoughts that have as their content object 
dependent singular propositions. In this subsection, I hope to more clearly outline the 
contemporary understanding of  singular thought as a type of  content, before moving on to 
competing conceptions that have become more popular in recent years. 
 One advantage of  the ‘singular thought as singular content’ view is, upon inputting 
any given thought, the theory is theoretically able to function as a sort of  decision procedure 
which outputs whether or not the thought is singular or not. For example, compare the two 
following cases: 
 
Case 1: I am watching something small fly through my yard and think to myself, “that must 
be a bumblebee due to its size.”  
 
Case 2: I am sitting inside my house and think, “there are bumblebees in London.” 
 
Most singular thought theorists are willing to admit that these two cases represent two 
 Such a reading was labelled the ‘non-orthodox reading of  Frege’ so as to indicate that the orthodox reading 24
of  Fregean Sinn is not cashed out in object dependent terms. Instead, the orthodox reading of  Frege is along 
broadly descriptivist lines. 
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different kinds of  thought. The first case is supposed to be a paradigmatic instance of  a 
singular thought, since I am thinking of  something that it is a bumblebee. The second case is 
generally taken to be paradigmatic of  a general thought, since rather than being about any 
particular (or singular) bumblebee, it is about the property bumblebee in London, to the effect 
that it is instantiated.  
 If  the distinction between singular and general thoughts is granted as a genuine 
distinction, then it remains for theorists to determine the criterion we ought to use to 
determine whether any given thought is singular or general (presupposing for our present 
purposes that the answer here must be bivalent). The singular thought as singular content 
theorist argues that what distinguishes the type of  case as expressed in Case 1 above from 
those expressed in Case 2 is that they each express different kinds of  contents.  These 25
contents can be explicated via the propositional semantics provided by someone such as 
Russell. The proposition expressed by the embedded sentence in the first case can be 




which is an ordered pair containing the object a, and the property bumblebee. It simply 
represents that a instantiates the property bumblebee. In other words, a first-order function: 
which in this instance hopefully outputs the value True (unless my eyesight and judgement is 
failing in our current example). The proposition expressed by the embedded sentence in the 




which states that the property bumblebee is instantiated by something in London. In other 
words, it expresses a general proposition (or, alternatively, a second-order function in 
standard logic).  
 The ‘singular thought as singular content’ view gives us a way to demarcate singular 
thoughts from general thoughts on the basis of  what kind of  proposition the thought 
expresses. To return to our example from the previous section involving Mont Blanc, 
< a , Bu m blebee >
λ x . [Bu m blebee(x) ∙ In L on d on(x)]
 As we shall see in proceeding sections, there are views that demarcate singular from general thoughts via 25
features other than content (e.g., by functional role, metasemantic properties, etc.). 
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thoughts about Mont Blanc are singular if, and only if, they express propositions containing 
Mont Blanc as a constituent. Likewise, since my thought about a (the bumblebee) contains a 
as a constituent, in this instance on the grounds that I am able to identify the object 
perceptually, it satisfies the singularity condition.    
 This brings us to an interesting feature of  the singular content conception of  singular 
thought: namely, such a characterization seems to commit this view to the idea that singular 
thoughts are object dependent. How could my thought be about a, the bumblebee, if  a did 
not exist? Conversely, it seems quite obvious that I could think that there are bumblebees in 
London even if  this turns out to be false — I would merely be thinking a property is 
satisfied in a certain domain when it is, in fact, not. However, how could I be thinking of  
something that it is a bumblebee if  it did not exist? 
 The fact that this particular conception of  singular thought entails that such thoughts 
are object dependent is a feature of  it that is often used to critique the view itself. If  a 
hallmark of  thought is intentionality, and if  Brentano (1874) is correct in arguing that a mark 
of  intentionality is intentional in-existence, then it seems that demarcating two purportedly 
distinct kinds of  thought via object dependent features seems altogether misguided.  As 26
Goodman and Genone (2020) put it, “several theorists have argued that some ‘empty’ cases 
share with referentially successful singular thoughts some relevant range of  conceptual, 
epistemic, or cognitive features such that they should be classified the same way” (3). Instead 
of  delineating thoughts in terms of  content, perhaps we should demarcate singular from 
general thoughts via features that are intrinsic to the mental, so to speak, or by their 
functional role. This is, broadly speaking, the direction that some Liberalists, especially 
cognitivists, pursue (see 2.2.3 below).  
 Additionally, some philosophers have taken aim at the singular thought as singular 
content view on the grounds that it fails to “give us traction with questions about what 
enables thinkers to think singular thoughts” (Goodman, 2018). Jeshion (2010), for example, 
thinks that the view that singular thoughts have singular content does little in regards to 
explaining the cognitive and epistemic capacities involved in thinking such thoughts, and, as a 
result, fails to be explanatorily adequate. In other words, if  we take singular thoughts to be 
attitudes to towards singular contents, it may tell us what is entertained in thinking a singular 
thought, but not how it is so entertained. Therefore, as Goodman and Genone (2020) state, 
 See Sainsbury (2005), Crane (2011), and Taylor (2010) for criticisms of  the singular thought as singular 26
content conception along these non-object dependent grounds. 
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the theory is limited. Even worse for the conception of  singular thought as singular content, 
if  any alternative theory is able to uniformly answer the ‘what’ and ‘how’ questions, then, 
given the law of  parsimony, there seems little reason to endorse the view that singular 
thought is singular content. This will, by and large, be the approach that cognitivists take (see 
Chapter Three).   
 However, although we will not consider these criticisms of  the content conception in 
greater depth until Chapter Three, a few brief  responses on behalf  of  the content theorist 
are warranted. First, in the theory of  reference, it is common to distinguish between the 
semantical question versus the metasemantical question, or, as Marti (1995) puts it, the 
question pertaining to the contribution of  reference from that of  the mechanism of  
reference. Extending this framework to that of  a theory of  thought (as is commonplace), it is 
perhaps too stringent for us to expect the conception of  singular thought as singular content 
to account for both the contribution and the mechanism behind such thoughts in one broad 
stroke. The content conception gives us a clear explanation of  what is contributed in 
instances of  singular thought, just as a referentialist semantics tells us that an object is what is 
contributed to propositions expressed by utterances containing a non-empty proper name. 
On most versions of  referentialism, the account as to the mechanism of  this contribution is 
that history of  that name and the interlocutors exist in some sort of  causal-historical chain 
with the object so named. Likewise, many singular thought as content theorists have 
amended their theory by appealing to various relations we stand in with various objects in 
order to account for the mechanism of  singular thought. They claim that singular thoughts 
are irreducibly relational. We cannot, therefore, account for singular thoughts solely in virtue 
of  what is contributed, but need to also consider the mechanism through which such 
contents are entertained. The suggestion, then, is that we need to consider epistemic and 
causal factors in our theory of  singular thought, and not solely which kind of  content is 
being entertained. In fact, Russell himself  was an early advocate of  such a view. The 
contribution of  a singular thought was understood to be a Russellian proposition, while the 
mechanism that explained such a thought was supposed to be acquaintance with the requisite 
constituents of  said thought. We will consider the relational conception of  singular thought 
in more detail in the proceeding section.  27
 For the idea that singular thoughts are irreducibly relational, see McDowell (1984), Evans (1982), Taylor 27
(2000), Braun (2005), Bach (2010), and Recanati (2010). 
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 That being said, even those theorists that argue against the content conception can 
agree that it is nonetheless a useful way to initially characterize the debate. Goodman and 
Genone (2020) summarize this point nicely: 
 Although this [the singular thought as singular content conception] definition has   
 lost popularity … it remains a useful starting point, for it makes clear what are   
 arguably for everyone central features of  the distinction between singular thought and   
 descriptive/general thought … Another way of  putting the point is that, by everyone’s   
 lights, the theoretical notion of  singular thought is used to capture a contrast, at the   
 level of  thought, analogous to the contrast in language between two different kinds of    
 “singular term”: those that are descriptive (like definite and indefinite descriptions) and  
 those that are referential (like names, demonstratives, and indexicals). (6-7, their italics) 
The gist of  what Goodman and Genone are pointing out is that whether or not one 
ultimately agrees with the conception of  singular thought as singular content, the initial way 
it explains the divide between Case 1 type instances and Case 2 type instances is a plausible 
starting point for any theory of  singular thought. I alluded to this point earlier when I 
mentioned that most singular thought theorists are willing to admit that these two cases 
represent two different kinds of  thought. An obvious way of  explaining this difference is in 
terms of  their content, and if  we disagree with this conception, then we need to explain why 
an alternative account accommodates the explicandum to a greater extent than the content 
conception is capable of.  
     2.2.2 Singular Thought as Relational Thought  
There have been two main attempts to individuate singular thought without appealing to 
content. The first involves the mechanism through which an object of  thought is 
determined. Some philosophers (most notably Bach and Evans) have appealed to causal 
and/or epistemic relations and mechanisms in order to demarcate singular thoughts from 
general thoughts. The second involves an appeal to the functional role of  singular thoughts. 
In this section, I will briefly outline the singular thought as relational thought conception, 
illustrate a way that it can be paired with the content conception to overcome the objection 
that the content conception is limited, and introduce a few of  the main critiques the 
relational theory has faced. I will then examine the attempt to demarcate singular from 
general thoughts via their functional role in section 2.2.3 below.  
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 There are two primary types of  relations that philosophers have appealed to in order 
to offer an account what differentiates singular thought from general thought. The first type 
of  view claims that the requisite relation is a causal one, with theorists such as Bach (1987) 
claiming that “the relation that makes something the object of  a de re thought is a causal 
relation” (12). The second type of  view claims that the requisite relation is an epistemic one, 
such as the possession of  knowledge that enables the thinker to discriminate the object of  
thought from all other objects (see  Evans 1982).  Both accounts claim that singular thought 28
is a cognitive phenomena that is  irreducibly relational.   29
 By appealing to either a causal or epistemic relation, the singular thought as relational 
thought conception is readily able to offer us an explanation as to mechanism of  how 
singular thoughts are entertained. For example, consider the two cases introduced in the 
previous section: 
Case 1: I am watching something small fly through my yard and think to myself, “that must 
be a bumblebee due to its size.”  
 
Case 2: I am sitting inside my house and think, “there are bumblebees in London.” 
These cases were intended to capture the intuitive sense in which a singular thought differs 
from a general thought. By appealing to either a causal or epistemic relation, the relational 
theorist argues that we are able to demarcate Case 1 type thoughts from Case 2 type thoughts 
in virtue of  whether or not such relations hold. In Case 1, I am causally related to the 
bumblebee through my perceptual faculties. Alternatively, it could also be said that an 
epistemic condition is satisfied, since I am capable of  spatially locating the bumblebee, and 
therefore possess discriminating knowledge of  the bumblebee. However, in Case 2, it seems 
that I am neither causally related to any particular bumblebee in London, nor am I able to 
discriminate any one bumblebee in London from another on the basis of  the thought 
 This is one way to formulate what Evans’ (1982) has called ‘Russell’s Principle.’ Since the nuances of  Evans’ 28
position are rich and many, and since I’ll be covering his view in great detail in Chapter Three, the remainder of  
this brief  outline on the relational conception will primarily focus on Bach’s causal-relationalism, since it is, in 
many ways, the simpler view — while nevertheless capturing the general approach of  relational views in 
general. 
 The view that singular thought is dependent on the satisfaction of  either a causal or epistemic relation is the 29
contemporary descendent of  Russell’s notion of  acquaintance. This will be explained in more detail in section 
2.3.2 below. 
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content entertained in Case 2 alone. Such a thought therefore qualifies as general or 
descriptive in nature.  
 Now consider the following cases: 
 
Case 3: I am sitting inside my house and think, “some bumblebee in London is faster than the 
rest.”  
 
Case 4: I am sitting inside my house, and having just watched a documentary on a famous 
bumblebee [named Bee], think to myself, “Bee must be the fastest in all of  London!”  
 
Whereas in Case 2 it seems plausible I am not thinking of  any bumblebee in particular, 
instead thinking that the property bumblebee in London is instantiated, in Case 3 it seems as if  I 
am thinking of  some particular bumblebee in London that it is faster than the rest (let’s 
presume there is a fastest bumblebee in London who is called Bee). However, unless I’ve 
been to London and have seen Bee myself, or have heard that Bee is the fastest bumblebee in 
London, etc., then it seems that I cannot claim to stand in a causal relation to Bee. It also 
seems problematic to suppose that an epistemic relation is satisfied in the instance in which 
I’ve neither been to London nor heard of  Bee, for then it would not be the case that I am 
thinking of  Bee that he is the fastest, but instead would be thinking that some property 
(fastest) is uniquely possessed by one bumblebee in London. Which object that is is 
determined by the fact it satisfies some description, but as Kripke (1980) has illustrated, the 
epistemic and modal behaviour of  descriptions suggests that in Case 3 the content of  my 
thought would remain unchanged whether or not there even was a fastest bumblebee in 
London, but this is not the case in Case 4. Even if  it turns out that Bee is not the fastest 
bumblebee in London, in Case 4 it seems as if  my thought would still be about Bee — such 
thoughts are rigid. Conversely, in Case 3 it would make no sense if  I heard that the fastest 
bumblebee in London is not the fastest bumblebee in London, but in Case 4 it is still 
coherent to claim that Bee is not the fastest bumblebee in London.  
 Bach (1987) thinks that the contrast between general thoughts and singular thoughts 
can be captured via the distinction between thoughts that are determined satisfactionally and 
those that are determined relationally (as noted above, he takes the requisite relation to be a 
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causal one).  He writes: 30
 Since the object of  a descriptive thought is determined satisfactionally, the fact that   
 the thought is of  that object does not require any connection between thought and   
 object. However, the object of  a de re thought is determined relationally. For    
 something to be the object of  a de re thought, it must stand in a certain kind of    
 relation to that very thought. (12)  
In Case 3, I am merely thinking of  whichever bumblebee happens to satisfy the description, 
whereas in Case 4 I am having a de re thought about Bee in virtue of  standing in a causal 
relation to Bee himself. Bach thinks that the way a thought’s object is determined provides a 
way to delineate singular from general thoughts.  
 It should be noted that it is entirely consistent to hold that what differentiates 
singular from general thought is whether or not the content of  the thought is itself  singular or 
general, whilst also maintaining that it is either a causal or epistemic relation that enables 
thought content(s) to be singular. Whereas the content conception considered in the 
previous section gives us an explanation as to the contribution of  singular thought, the 
relational conception gives us an explanation as to the mechanism. The relational conception 
thereby gives the content theorist the ability to respond to the criticism that their theory is 
limited. Conversely, it is also conceptually possible for these two different conceptions to be 
divorced from one another. It is arguable that a thinker is able to entertain a singular content 
without standing in either a causal or epistemic relation with the object of  thought (as we 
shall see below, this is sufficient for a theorist to be called a Liberalist, and this constitutes one 
of  the biggest disputes within the contemporary literature), and it is also possible to hold a 
relational theory of  singular thought without necessarily thinking that singular thoughts are 
propositional attitudes towards a singular content (they may, for example, be attitudes 
towards mental files or tags). However, the dominant theory in the philosophical literature, 
what I will call the Standard View (see below), is that singular thoughts have singular contents, 
and that these contents are subject to an acquaintance condition — which is often cashed 
out in causal or epistemic terms as briefly outlined above.  
 A particularly influential hybrid of  the content/relational conception has been put 
forth by Burge (1977) according to which singular thought involves bearing a nonconceptual 
contextual relation to a particular object. On this account, singular thoughts are inherently 
 It should be noted that the causal view extends beyond only instances of  perceptual acquaintance with an 30
object. Bach (1987), for example, argues that communication chains can also satisfy the requisite causal criterion 
for singular thoughts to be communicated and entertained amongst interlocutors.
VINDICATING  EVANS       40
indexical in nature, and are most aptly characterized via their relational nature.  As we saw 31
above, Evans (1982) and McDowell (1982) have similarly argued that singular thoughts are 
object-dependent (or ‘Russellian’) thoughts.  Descriptive thoughts, on Burge’s account, are 32
inherently conceptual, involving conceptual conditions which act as satisfaction criterion 
enabling us to pick out which object we are thinking about (if  any).  Kaplan (2012) likens 33
such descriptive conditions as those that enable us to ‘search’ for the object satisfying such 
conditions. For example, the descriptive or conceptual content of  the thought <the greatest 
pupil of  Plato> may be satisfied uniquely by Aristotle, and in a sense be about Aristotle, even 
if  the bearer of  the thought has never stood in the appropriate contextual relation to 
Aristotle. 
 At this stage, it may be helpful to summarize what we have discussed so far about the 
relational conception of  singular thought. The singular thought as relational thought 
conception is capable of  serving two distinct functions. First, it can provide us with a 
standalone theory as to what a singular thought is: it is a thought that is determined via 
standing in a special relation to the object(s) of  thought. Second, it can provide us with a 
theory as to the mechanism of  singular thought — or how a singular thought is entertained. 
Some philosophers have used the relational conception for either of  these purposes, others 
have used it for both. 
 However, although the relational conception is able to account for the mechanism of  
singular thought, something that the content conception was unable to do alone, the theory 
has been critiqued for several reasons. First, like the content conception, the relational 
conception is open to the objection that there are object independent singular thoughts (see 
Jeshion 2002, Sainsbury 2005, and Crane 2011). It is hard to see how one could stand in a 
relation to something that does not exist. Second, the notion that singular thoughts are 
dependent on the satisfaction of  either a causal or epistemic condition has itself  been 
critiqued. Liberalists claim that there are no such conditions on singular thought, and that 
 However, Evans (1982) has suggested that although bearing a contextual and causal relation to an object is a 31
necessary condition for entertaining a singular thought, such a relation alone is not sufficient. Evans requires 
that in addition to bearing a contextual and causal relation to an object the bearer of  the thought also needs to 
possess what he calls discriminating knowledge of  the object. 
 Evans calls object-dependent thoughts Russellian Thoughts — a kind of  thought such that if  the object of  the 32
thought never existed the thought would not have existed either. The similarity to Burge’s suggestion is as 
follows: one cannot bear a contextual relation to a particular object if  there is no object to bear such a 
contextual relation to. Hence, if  we characterize the content of  de re thought in terms of  such a relation, de re 
thoughts turn out to be object dependent as Evans and McDowell have argued. 
 This distinction largely owes itself  to Bach (1987), who argues that whereas singular thoughts have relational 33
conditions, descriptive thoughts have satisfaction conditions. 
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this entails the relational conception should be abandoned altogether. For example, 
Hawthorne and Manley (2012) argue that the claim that a causal relation is necessary for 
singular thought “is an ad hoc gesture, invoked whenever a theorist wishes to deny the 
presence of  singular thought, towards whatever tenuous causal relation would explain its 
absence. But why think there is any such relation in the first place?” (23). The general thrust 
of  the various critiques of  the relational conception is that it gets the mechanism story 
wrong — singular thought is not dependent on causal or epistemic relations. Obviously, if  
the relational conception gets the mechanism story wrong, then the entire story it is trying to 
tell is erroneous. How could we demarcate general and singular thoughts along the 
satisfactional-relational axis if  singular thoughts are not irreducibly relational? Liberalists 
argue against the relational conception and claim that (a) descriptively mediated thoughts can 
sometimes be singular, (b) there are non-relational accounts of  the mechanism that more 
aptly capture the mechanism behind singular thought, and (c) there is simply no principled 
reason why we need to invoke either a causal or epistemic constraint. 
     2.2.3 Singular Thought and Mental Files  
In the previous section, I noted that there have been two main attempts to individuate 
singular thought without an appeal to content. The first involves appealing to the 
purportedly relational nature of  singular thought. The second involves an appeal to the 
functional, conceptual, or cognitive role of  singular thoughts. The general idea is that what is 
distinctive about the psychological, conceptual, and cognitive role of  singular thoughts is that 
they employ mental files (see Goodman and Genone 2020). The notion of  a mental file 
within the philosophical literature is traceable to Grice (1969), but several philosophers (e.g., 
Perry (1980), Recanati (1993), and Jeshion (2010)) have developed the notion in important 
ways.  In this section, I will outline how the mental files framework has been used to 34
individuate singular thought in a way that is not dependent on either the content or the 
relational conception(s). In particular, I will be concerned with briefly outlining a view that 
Jeshion advocates called cognitivism — a type of  Liberalism towards singular thought that is 
based on a mental files framework.  
 Prior to outlining Jeshion’s cognitivism, it is important to note that the notion of  
 Other proponents of  a mental file account of  singular thought include Powell (2010) and Crane (2011). 34
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mental files has been developed in ways that are compatible with a relational conception of  
singular thought as well as in ways that are antithetical to such a conception. For example, 
both Recanati (2012) and Jeshion (2010) take mental files to be clusters of  predicates that 
one believes to be co-instantiated, with Jeshion claiming that “mental files bind together our 
information about individuals they are about and individuate our cognitive perspective on 
those individuals” (129). However, there is disagreement regarding how the mental files 
framework is to be implemented into a theory of  singular thought. Recanati argues that 
although mental files are an important aspect of  singular thought, an acquaintance condition 
still needs to be satisfied in order for someone to be able to think a singular thought. 
Therefore, like the content conception, the mental files conception of  singular thought is not 
necessarily mutually exclusive with the relational conception. However, throughout the 
remainder of  this section I’ll briefly outline Jeshion’s view, which dispenses with an 
acquaintance or relational condition altogether.  
 Cognitivism is Jeshion’s view that singular thought is constitutively from and through 
a mental file. The gist of  the idea is that when I think of  Bee as the fastest bumblebee in 
London, I am thinking of  Bee through a mental file that binds together any predicative 
information I may have about Bee (e.g., that he’s a bee, that he’s the fastest in London, that 
he has a limited lifespan, etc). Importantly, however, the descriptive content I store in my 
Bee-file is (a) distinct from the file itself, and (b) capable of  mischaracterizing Bee (e.g., my 
Bee-file still retains its identity criterion even it some of  the descriptive content is incorrect, 
insofar as the majority of  the information stored within it is predicable of  Bee).  
 An additional claim made by the cognitivist is that the formation of  a mental file is 
subject to a significance condition. According to the significance condition, “a mental file is 
initiated on an individual only if  that individual is significant to the agent with respect to her 
plans, projects, affective states, motivations” (ibid., 136). For example, say I am watching a 
BBC documentary on the bumblebee population in London, and how one particular bee, 
Bee, is the fastest. Surely it is significant to my aims (e.g., following along and enjoying the 
television program, using my newfound bumblebee knowledge to impress my friends, etc.) 
that I can track the information about Bee that the documenters are conveying. It is 
important that I, for example, track that they are talking about the same bumblebee, and that 
instances of  anaphora throughout the documentary refer back to Bee, and so on. Jeshion 
argues that the way I do this is by the formation of  a mental file, in this case, my Bee-file. 
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Jeshion claims that the “significance condition on singular thought replaces an acquaintance 
condition on singular thought” (ibid., 136).  
 Tying all of  this into our previous discussion, we can therefore take Jeshion’s 
significance condition to be an account of  the mechanism of  singular thought, while the 
mental files themselves are an account of  what is contributed in thinking a singular thought. 
When Sting sits at home and watches the BBC documentary on Bee, any singular thoughts 
he has of  Bee are constitutively file based. The mechanism that explains the formation of  
these Bee-thoughts is that Bee was significant to his plans, projects, affective states, 
motivations, etc. Contrast this with the Standard View, according to which Sting’s thoughts 
are about Bee because he is causally or epistemically related to Bee in a way that enables him 
to think thoughts that have singular content, roughly of  the form <Bee , __>.  
 Jeshion’s cognitivism represents one of  the most thoroughly developed Liberalist 
alternatives to the Standard View on singular thought precisely because it offers as an 
explanation as to both the contribution and mechanism of  singular thought. Whereas, as we 
shall see, other proponents of  Liberalism (Kaplan (1989a), Hawthorne and Manley (2012), 
Borg (2007), etc.) have arguments as to why we should not adopt the Standard View, Jeshion 
develops a theory that accounts for both the mechanism and contribution of  singular 
thought. In this sense it could be said that whereas more varieties of  Liberalism are 
destructive in nature, demonstrating why we should not be Standard Theorists, Cognitivism 
is constructive in nature, offering us a more fully developed alternative that is potentially 
capable of  accounting for the same explicandum as the Standard Theory. Additionally, it 
claims to be able to account for intuitions about both acquaintanceless and object 
independent singular thought. It is for this reason that a lot of  attention will be devoted to 
analyzing cognitivism as one of  the main anti-Evans positions that we will discuss in Chapter 
Three.  
 For now, we will turn our attention to a survey of  the contemporary debates within 
the philosophical landscape — many of  which are intimately related to the various 
conceptions of  singular thought that we have considered throughout the present section(s).  
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§III The Contemporary Philosophical Landscape 
     2.3.1 The Nature of Singular Thought  
Now that we have had an overview of  several conceptions of  singular thought, it is time to 
consider the main debates within the contemporary philosophical landscape, many of  which 
we have already encountered in one form or another.  
 There are three primary philosophical issues regarding singular thought. First, what is 
the hallmark of  singular thought that distinguishes it from descriptive/general thought? 
Once we distinguish between thought as a mental state (i.e., the process of  thinking) from the 
content of  such states (i.e., what is actually thought), then it remains to determine what 
differentiates singular thought from descriptive thought. This can be thought of  as an 
ontological question about the nature of  singular thought itself  — i.e., what is it? In the 
previous section we considered several ways analytic philosophers have attempted to 
individuate singular thought: qua a type of  content, a special relation, or as thought from and 
through a mental file (see the previous section for a more detailed examination of  each of  
these attempts to individuate singular thought).  
 
     2.3.2 Acquaintance Theorists Versus Liberalists  
The second philosophical issue regarding singular thought goes back to Russell’s idea that in 
order to think about a particular object one needs to be acquainted with that object. Many 
philosophers have followed in Russell’s footsteps and argue that some sort of  acquaintance 
condition has to be satisfied in order to think a singular thought about an object.  However, 35
unlike Russell (c. 1912), most subsequent philosophers in the so-called acquaintance 
‘tradition’ have held that we can be acquainted with the macroscopic objects of  everyday life 
(such as Bee or Mont Blanc), and thereby reject the Cartesian Assumption that motivated 
Russell to develop such an austere notion of  acquaintance (see 2.1.3). As Hawthorne and 
Manley (2012) put it, “the history of  the notion of  acquaintance has, since Russell, been 
marked by steady liberalization” (19). In fact, it could be argued that the contemporary usage 
 Philosophers who have argued for some version of  an acquaintance condition on singular thought include: 35
Russell (1912), Donnellan (1977), Burge (1977), Lewis (1979), Evans (1982), McDowell (1984), Bach (1987, 
2010), and Recanati (1993, 2010, 2012). 
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of  the term ‘acquaintance’ bears little resemblance to Russell’s original notion at all — that is, 
the various views that have come to be lumped under the ‘acquaintance theorist’ heading are 
so broad that it is hardly a helpful idiom when it comes to clarifying the theoretical 
commitments of  any given view.  Some views bear more resemblance to Russell’s original 36
notion than others, and it can be said that the various acquaintance based views in the 
contemporary literature bear little more than a family resemblance to one another. What I 
propose is distinctive about modern acquaintance theorists in the singular thought literature 
is that they argue that in order to think a singular thought about an object some sort of  
special causal or epistemic condition needs to hold.  However, for the sake of  continuity 37
with the existing literature, I will continue to use acquaintance talk — it is simply important 
to remember that within the contemporary literature positing either a causal or epistemic 
constraint on singular thought is sufficient for the acquaintance theorist title, rather than a 
commitment to the more epistemically austere view of  Russell (c. 1912).  
 With that brief  terminological remark out of  the way, we can now consider the 
second main debate within the contemporary landscape: whether or not we can dispense 
with an acquaintance constraint on singular thought altogether. The Standard View, named 
so as to distance it from the unnecessary baggage that comes along with acquaintance talk, 
claims that a necessary causal and/or epistemic condition needs to be satisfied in order for 
someone to be able to entertain a singular thought. Liberalism is the view that there is no 
general acquaintance restriction on singular thought.  Liberalism is the main thesis that is 38
defended throughout The Reference Book by Hawthorne and Manley (2012), although semantic 
instrumentalists (Kaplan 1989, Harman 1977, Borg 2007) and cognitivists (Jeshion 2010) also 
defend the Liberalist thesis that acquaintance is not a necessary condition for singular 
thought.  
 As we saw above, any well rounded theory of  singular thought has to account for 
both (a) what is semantically contributed in an instance of  singular thought, and (b) the 
 See the newly released volume Acquaintance (2020), edited by Knowles and Raleigh, for more on the legacy of  36
Russell’s notion of  acquaintance for contemporary philosophy — including disputes pertaining to whether or 
not there is any unifying use of  the expression. 
 Contemporary acquaintance based views have appeared under various headings in the most recent 37
philosophical literature: Hawthorne and Manley (2012) distinguish epistemic acquaintance theories from causal 
acquaintance theories, Dickie (2015) calls the modern varieties ‘extended acquaintance’ views, while Goodman 
(2018) calls them causal externalist views. 
 Hawthorne and Manley (2012) are responsible for the ‘Liberalist’ terminology, but several distinct views are 38
united under the heading through their unified rejection of  an acquaintance condition on singular thought (see 
Goodman and Genone 2020). 
VINDICATING  EVANS       46
metasemantic mechanism through which such semantic contents are contributed, otherwise 
the theory is open to the objection that it is limited. The prevailing view has been that an 
acquaintance condition is required in order to have a singular thought, since the satisfaction 
of  an acquaintance condition is purported to explain how one is able to entertain a singular 
thought. For example, if  I am causally and spatially related to an object, say the pen beside 
me on my desk, then in virtue of  these relations I am able to think about this particular pen. 
In this sense, you could say that I am acquainted with the pen. However, if  there are genuine 
instances of  singular thought in the absence of  either a causal or epistemic constraint 
grounding such thoughts, then it would appear that the Standard View should be rejected. 
This latter strategy is, generally, the route that Liberalists take in order to substantiate their 
position. For example, suppose I use the description ‘the smallest pen in London’ to fix the 
referent of  the  proper name ‘Horace’ — are my subsequent thoughts about Horace singular 
or not? Perhaps it begs the question to assume these are ‘Horace-directed’ thoughts about 
Horace at all, but there is at least an intuitive sense in which such thoughts seem Horace-
directed. If  we concede that descriptively introduced referential terms are capable of  
securing genuine aboutness, then it would appear to do this in the absence of  any 
acquaintance condition being met. In this instance, the descriptively introduced referential 
term was the mechanism behind my Horace-thought, rather than any special kind of  relation 
to Horace. Hence, Liberalism is broadly the view that the Standard Theory gets the 
mechanism story wrong. We will see various attempts to substantiate Liberalism in Chapter 
Three.  
     2.3.3 Communication Based Singular Thought  
 
Lastly, the third philosophical issue within the contemporary landscape is concerned with the 
relationship between singular thought and language.  Natural language has a number of  39
peculiar and fascinating psychological properties. Language enables us to entertain thoughts 
that we would otherwise be unable to entertain or communicate. For example, it seems 
intuitively reasonable that it is through language that I am able to entertain and communicate 
the thought that Schopenhauer wore blue jeans, despite the fact that I’ve never been 
 It should be noted, for the sake of  historical interest, that the contemporary debates about singular thought 39
within the analytic tradition largely arose out of  debates within the philosophy of  language concerning (a) the 
semantics of  singular terms, and whether to go the referentialist or descriptivist route, and (b) propositional 
attitude reports and the occurrence of  referentially opaque terms. 
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perceptually acquainted with Schopenhauer, or the fact that jeans and Schopenhauer did not 
historically co-exist. Furthermore, language is a tool which we can use to talk about particular 
things –  e.g., the coffee cup across the room, Schopenhauer, the Moon, etc. As a competent 
speaker of  a natural language, I can arguably use what Evans (1982) calls the intuitive 
category of  referring expressions to refer to particular things.  For example, I am able to use 40
a variety of  English expressions such as ‘this,’ ‘Schopenhauer,’ ‘the cup across the room,’ etc., 
to refer my interlocutor to something in particular. Such expressions appear to belong to the 
class of  singular terms – i.e., natural language expressions that are conventionally used to refer 
to particulars.  It seems plausible that our competence with singular terms within our 41
language is part of  what enables us to entertain and communicate singular thoughts about 
particulars that would otherwise remain unaccessible or uncommunicable. Such thoughts will 
be called communication-based singular thoughts, so as to contrast them with singular thoughts that 
may be grounded in perception, memory, and so on.  
 Although most philosophers accept the existence of  communication-based singular 
thought, it is disputed which kinds of  linguistic expressions themselves are apt for the job of  
communicating genuinely singular thoughts, and the underlying explanation of  how this 
occurs. Demonstratives (e.g., ‘this,’ ‘that’) and indexicals (e.g., ‘here,’ ‘I’) seem particularly well 
suited to accomplish the task of  grounding communication-based singular thoughts, while 
the issue seems more complicated if  the expressions utilized are proper names (e.g., 
‘Schopenhauer’), definite descriptions (e.g., ‘the fiercest critic of  Hegel’), incomplete 
descriptions (e.g., ‘the table’), blind descriptions (e.g., ‘the first person born in the 22nd 
Century’), empty names (e.g., ‘Vulcan’), fictional names (e.g., ‘Walter White’), deferred 
demonstratives or pronouns (e.g., ‘that person’ or ‘him’ while pointing at an empty chair 
usually occupied by a particular person), descriptive names (e.g., ‘by ‘Horace’ I mean ‘the so-
and-so’’), or even bare predicates (e.g., ‘suit’, to refer to a particular cooperate executive). 
Determining which expressions are capable of  communicating singular thoughts is one of  
 It is important to note that the set is called the ‘intuitive category’ because certain members of  this set may, 40
for a variety of  distinct theoretical reasons, not properly belong to the actual category of  referring expressions 
at all. For example, on Russell’s (1905) account, descriptions are not referring expressions at all, instead being 
rendered as quantificational phrases at the level of  their logical form. 
 Which expressions properly belong to the category of  singular terms is one of  the main controversies in the 41
philosophy of  language. However, Evans (1982) has noted that the intuitive category of  singular terms can at the 
very least be determined via a shared (a) grammar, and (b) function. These terms typically occur as the 
grammatical noun phrase and their primary function is their ability to be used as tools of  reference. 
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the issues which continues to generate the greatest interest within the contemporary 
literature.  42
 The debate concerning communication-based singular thought is intimately related to 
the debate concerning whether or not a necessary acquaintance condition should be rejected. 
As discussed above, one strategy employed by Liberalists is to argue that descriptively 
introduced referential terms (DIRTs) are capable of  generating singular thoughts ‘on the 
cheap,’ without the need for any additional causal or epistemic conditions being satisfied. The 
fundamental idea behind semantic instrumentalism, a sub-variety of  Liberalism, is nicely 
captured by Kaplan (1989a)  when he states: 
 A special form of  knowledge of  an object is neither required nor presupposed in   
 order that a person may entertain as object of  thought a singular proposition   
 involving that object … What allows us to take various propositional attitudes   
 towards singular propositions is not the form of  our acquaintance with the object   
 but is rather our ability to manipulate the conceptual apparatus of  direct reference.   
 (536) 
As Jeshion explains it, the idea is that the very apparatus of  direct reference enables us to 
engage in ‘cognitive restructuring,’ such that we’re able to think novel singular thoughts solely 
in virtue of  exploiting the mechanisms of  direct reference via DIRTs. If  this is true, then it 
follows that the Standard Theory is false.  
 To summarize: the main debates within the contemporary philosophical landscape 
involve (a) the nature of  singular thought, (b) whether or not acquaintance is a necessary 
condition for singular thought, and (c) the connection between natural language and singular 
thought, including whether or not descriptively introduced singular terms are capable of  
generating singular thoughts. It should be noted that these debates are not mutually exclusive 
from one another. For example, if  one argues that there are descriptively mediated singular 
thoughts, she may justify this conclusion without appealing to a pre-established attempt to 
reject an acquaintance condition; or use this conclusion to independently argue that we 
should reject an acquaintance condition; or, having already rejected an acquaintance 
condition, use that conclusion in an attempt to justify the existence of  descriptively mediated 
singular thoughts. However, the most divisive split is whether or not one is a Liberalist. 
Whether or not one is a Liberalist determines which stance one is likely to take on any 
number of  the other issues. This can be gleamed via the following table: 
 See Jeshion (2010), Recanati (2012), Dickie (2015), and Goodman and Genone(2020). 42
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Whereas rejecting acquaintance as a necessary condition is sufficient to be a Liberalist, most 
Liberalists also reject that singular thoughts are object dependent, and argue that there are 
descriptively mediated thoughts — though these are not necessary for the position. The 
reason these views tend to go in tandem is usually because an endorsement of  descriptively 
mediated singular thoughts is likely to coincide with intuitions about both acquaintanceless 
and object dependent singular thoughts.  
 In the next chapter, I will reconstruct Gareth Evans’ position on these three issues. It 
may eventually turn out that, as a matter of  fact, Evans’ theory of  singular thought is 
altogether false and misguided. What I seek to demonstrate throughout the remainder of  this 
dissertation is that none of  the most recent Liberalist critiques of  Evans have succeeded — 
they are guilty of  either misevaluating or misidentifying the explicandum with which Evans 
was concerned.  
Type of  View Are there object 
independent singular 
thoughts?
Is acquaintance a 
necessary condition?
Are there descriptively 
mediated singular 
thoughts? 
Standard View No Yes No 
Liberalism Yes No Yes
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Chapter 3: Gareth Evans Versus Liberalism 
§I The Varieties of Reference  
 
     3.1.1 Evans: Background and Aims  
By the time of  his untimely and tragic passing at the age of  thirty-four, August 1980, Evans 
had been working for several years on a book about reference. However, at the time of  his 
death it was left unfinished, and significant portions of  the work were pieced together, 
edited, and eventually presented for publication by his close colleague and friend, John 
McDowell.  The resultant work of  these efforts was The Varieties of  Reference (1982)  — a 43 44
philosophically rich and dense work that covers an array of  topics related to the philosophy 
of  perception, action theory, philosophy of  language, and philosophy of  mind. My aim 
throughout the present section is to present an account of  Gareth Evans’ theory of  singular 
thought. This account will then be defended on the behalf  of  Evans from a number of  
recent Liberalist critiques. I will begin by outlining the general background necessary to 
understand Evans’ theory, the aims for which he developed it, and the general themes that 
permeate and unite the work. The most crucial thesis advanced throughout The Varieties of  
Reference is that a number of  singular terms require for their understanding the satisfaction of  
what Evans calls Russell’s Principle, which we first encountered in 2.1.3. According to Russell’s 
Principle, “in order to be thinking about an object or to make a judgement about an object, 
one must know which object is in question — one must know which object it is that one is 
thinking about” (65). A large portion of  Evans’ project is explicating the relevant sense of  
‘knowing which’ involved. Evans utilizes his defence of  Russell’s Principle to argue that a 
number of  insights from the theory of  reference have been erroneously used to establish 
conclusions in the theory of  thought. 
 Despite the wide range of  aforementioned philosophical topics covered in VOR, his 
interest in these topics largely stemmed from and are united by a singular source: his intent 
to develop a comprehensive account of  the phenomena of  reference (1982, 3). Evans’ 
professional engagement with the theory of  reference goes back as far as his first published 
 McDowell consulted a number of  sources in order to make the editorial choices that he did: the unpublished 43
manuscripts, lecture transcripts, marginal notes, previously published material from Evans, etc.
 Hereafter VOR. 44
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piece, ‘The Causal Theory of  Names’ (1973), in which he argues both the descriptivist and 
causal-theory metasemantic accounts of  proper names are incorrect. Whereas the 
descriptivist account is insufficient because it fails to mention the requisite causal 
connections required to establish the referent of  a proper name, the causal-theory account 
fails because it is too simplistic and cannot accommodate the phenomena of  reference-
shifting — e.g., when ‘Madagascar’ began to refer to the island, Madagascar, rather than its 
original referent, Africa. Evans’ general point is that since the mainland is the causal source 
of  uses of  the name ‘Madagascar,’ the causal-theory by itself  seems to entail that even when 
it eventually was used to refer to Madagascar the semantic content would still be Africa, since 
that is the referent established by the original baptismal event. Evans argues that instead of  
seeing the causal-theory and descriptivism as entirely antithetical to one another, a Hegelian 
synthesis can be achieved, whereby the reference of  a proper name is determined by 
whichever object is the dominant causal source of  the information one has about the 
referent. Evans’ ability to unite two disparate positions is a skill that is fundamental to the 
position that emerges throughout VOR. 
 One of  the main reasons we considered the views of  both Frege and Russell in such 
depth in Chapter Two is because several elements he drew from their texts are imperative to 
understanding the foundations of  Evans’ philosophy. Evans himself  devotes a large portion 
of  Part One of  VOR explicating the views he extracts from Russell and Frege, and several 
of  the technical notions we considered in Chapter Two find a place within Evans’ mature 
theory of  singular thought and singular reference, albeit in a revised form. These include: 
Russellian acquaintance, object dependent thoughts, logically proper names, Fregean senses 
and modes of  presentation, mock thoughts, and, most importantly, Russell’s Principle. As we 
saw in Chapter Two, Russell and Frege diverged on many key issues, and an element of  
Evans’ ingenuity is illustrated through his attempt to synthesize seemingly incompatible 
elements of  Russell and Frege. For example, Evans argues that Fregean Sinn and object 
dependent (or Russellian) thoughts are compatible and jointly occurring phenomena. As 
Evans himself  puts it, “the fact that one is thinking about an object in a particular way can 
no more warrant the conclusion that one is not thinking of  the object in the most direct 
possible fashion, than the fact that one is giving something in a particular way warrants the 
view that one’s giving is somehow indirect” (62, his italics). Evans argues that demonstratives 
and other kinds of  singular terms require for their understanding that one think of  the 
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object in a particular way, and that this entails that such thoughts are, in fact, object 
dependent.  
 Whereas Frege and Russell were responsible for inaugurating the linguistic turn in 
analytic philosophy, whereby an analysis of  language was given priority over an analysis of  
thought, Dummett has argued that Evans can be read as reversing this priority. In Origins of  
Analytic Philosophy (1993), Dummett elaborates: 
 Some recent work in the analytical tradition has reversed this priority, in the order of   
 explanation, of  language over thought, and holds that language can be explained only 
 in terms of  antecedently given notions of  different types of  thought, considered   
 independently of  their linguistic expression. A good example of  this new trend is   
 Gareth Evans’ posthumous book, which essays an account, independent of  language, 
 of  what it is to think about an object in each of  various ways, and then seeks to   
 explain the different verbal means of  effecting reference to an object in terms of    
 these ways of  thinking about it. (4) 
Although it is incorrect to claim that Evans thinks that “language can be explained only in 
terms of  antecedently given notions of  different types of  thought” (my italics), as Dummett 
suggests, it is nevertheless true that Evans’ inquiry into the phenomena of  singular linguistic 
reference evolved in such a way that (a) he was inevitably led to a consideration of  singular 
thought independently of  any linguistic concerns, (b) he drew conclusions about singular 
reference from those he established about singular thought. Whereas Quine (1956), a 
proponent of  the linguistic turn, was motivated in part by the behaviourism prevalent at the 
time so as to consider overt linguistic acts, such as propositional attitude reporting, as the 
primary means through which to at least attempt to individuate de re thought, Evans rejects 
that propositional attitude reports are themselves a reliable means through which to attribute 
de re thoughts to an individual (see Section 5.3 of  VOR in particular). This quasi-rejection of  
the linguistic turn is reflected in the fact that Part Two of  VOR is entirely dedicated to an 
analysis of  thought, considered as a phenomena distinct from language, while it is only in Part 
Three that he considers linguistic phenomena proper.  
 Evans was primarily educated at Oxford, eventually coming to hold an academic 
position there himself, and was heavily influenced by fellow senior Oxonians such as P.F. 
Strawson and Michael Dummett. From Strawson (1959), he inherited the project of  
developing an account of  how we are able to identify which particulars we refer to with our 
use of  referring expressions. Evans (1982) suggests that Strawson has “stayed with an 
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essentially Russellian bifurcation between ‘demonstrative identification’ (knowledge by 
acquaintance) and ‘descriptive identification’ (knowledge by description)” (65).  A large part 45
of  VOR is concerned with whether or not these two modes of  identification are exhaustive, 
and if  not, what other modes of  identification need to be identified. From Dummett (1973), 
Evans inherited the project of  “trying to understand what would justify the application of  
the Fregean models to natural language, and with that understanding, trying to come forward 
with a better view of  the functioning of  ordinary English referring expressions” (ibid., 41). 
As we saw in Chapter Two, Frege held a two tiered semantics that distinguishes the semantic 
value of  an expression from its cognitive value. Part of  Evans’ project is determining the 
extent to which this model can be applied to ordinary English expressions such as indexicals, 
definite descriptions, and proper names; and, more specifically, determining the role of  
Fregean senses in a theory of  natural language and a theory of  thought.    
 One the main themes throughout the VOR is that we must remain skeptical of  
attempts to apply conclusions from the theory of  reference to the theory of  thought. Evans’ 
work is guided by what I label Evans’ Guiding Question, which asks whether a fundamental 
difference in the ways referring expressions of  ordinary language function ultimately rest 
upon fundamental differences in the ways in which it is open to us to think about particular 
objects. Evans spends a great deal of  VOR arguing that many referring expressions differ 
from one another precisely because of  the ways in which it is open for us to think about 
particular objects. What unites the varieties of  reference is that in order to be said to be able 
to think about a particular object the thinker must be able to satisfy Russell’s Principle. Evans 
states that: 
 The difficulty with Russell’s Principle has always been to explain what it means … In  
 order to make Russell’s Principle a substantial principle, I shall suppose that the   
 knowledge which it requires is what might be called discriminating knowledge: the   
 subject must have a capacity to distinguish the object of  his judgement from all other 
 things … We have the idea of  certain sufficient conditions for being able to    
 discriminate an object from all other things: for example, when one can perceive it at  
 the present time; when one can recognize it if  presented with it; and when one   
 knows distinguishing facts about it. (89, his italics) 
 It is important to note that Evans states that Strawson himself  seems to recognize that recognition based 45
identification is a viable third option that goes beyond the traditional Russellian dichotomy suggested here.  
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In the terminology previously established in Chapter Two, Russell’s Principle is the epistemic 
acquaintance condition that Evans defends throughout VOR. 
 The defence of  Russell’s Principle is so central to VOR that Evans states that 
“adherence to Russell’s Principle is fundamental to the view of  Russellian reference to be 
advanced in this book” (84). There are various modes of  identification that Evans argues are 
capable of  satisfying the constraint imposed by Russell’s Principle, including demonstrative 
identification, descriptive identification, self  identification, and recognition based 
identification (however, Evans never claims this list to be exhaustive). Evans claims that 
although the class of  modes of  identification is internally heterogenous, they are nonetheless 
unified by having to satisfy the demands of  Russell’s Principle:  
 What unifies the different modes of  identification recognized is conformity to the   
 requirement which the Principle imposes; but the important differences between   
 them are revealed by always pressing the question ‘How is it, in this case, that the   
 subject can be said to know which object his thought concerns?’ (84-85) 
Evans argues that the different ways through which Russell’s Principle can be satisfied 
explains the variegated ways in which different kinds of  singular terms enable someone to 
entertain singular thoughts. A demonstrative utterance, for example, may enable the hearer to 
spatially locate the object, which would constitute a means of  discriminating the object and 
thereby satisfying Russell’s Principle. An utterance involving a proper name, on the other 
hand, requires for its full understanding not only that one knows which proper name using 
practice they intend to be partaking in, but also that the intended referent “is the object 
which the speaker is aiming at with his use of  the name” (402). In either of  these instances we 
could then credit those individuals with a singular thought about the relevant object. Some 
of  Evans’ arguments in favour of  Russell’s Principle will be discussed in detail below (3.1.2).   
 Besides his spirited defence of  Russell’s Principle, another one of  Evans’ main aims 
is to argue for the existence of  Russellian thoughts as well as Russellian singular terms. For 
Evans, a Russellian Thought is a thought that “simply could not exist in the absence of  the 
object or objects which it is about” (71). Evans states that “if  any given line of  thought in 
this book could be said to be its main plot, it is, on account of  its generality, this one” (136). 
In addition to arguing that some thoughts are Russellian in this stringent object dependent 
sense in which we encountered in Chapter Two, Evans also argues “that many of  the 
referring expressions of  natural language are Russellian — that their significance depends on 
their having a referent” (85). According to Evans: 
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 A term is a Russellian singular term if  and only if  it is a member of  a category of    
 singular terms such that nothing is said by someone who utters a sentence containing 
 such a term unless the term has a referent — if  the term is empty, no move has been 
 made in the ‘language-game.’ To say that nothing has been said in a particular   
 utterance is, quite generally, to say that nothing constitutes understanding the utterance.  
 (71, his italics) 
Evans argues that there are two ways a singular term can be Russellian. Firstly, various uses 
of  singular terms depend upon grasping Russellian thoughts for their understanding. Since 
these thoughts are themselves Russellian, and the singular terms in question supervene on 
these thoughts for their understanding, it follows that such singular terms are themselves 
Russellian. Secondly, there are some singular terms, namely proper names, such that if  there 
is no referent, then nothing is said or semantically contributed to the propositions expressed 
by utterances containing them. If  there is nothing said, then there is no substantive notion of  
understanding what is said that can be gleamed, and such singular terms are therefore also 
Russellian.  
 So far we have encountered the two main themes of  VOR: (1) a sustained defence of  
Russell’s Principle (epistemic condition), and (2) a sustained defence of  the existence of  
Russellian (object-dependent) thoughts and singular terms. The theory of  singular thought 
that Evans develops throughout VOR can therefore be seen as a version of  the Standard 
View that we encountered in Chapter Two. The philosophical brilliance of  VOR is in the way 
that Evans attempts to connect these two themes. The way Evans thinks they are connected 
can, broadly speaking, be discerned from the way he structures the content of  the work 
itself. Part Two of  VOR is primarily concerned with defending Russell’s Principle and 
arguing for the existence of  thoughts that are Russellian. Evans argues that if  a subject can 
be credited with entertaining a Russellian thought about an object, then they must not only 
be in possession of  information derived from the object, but they must also be in possession 
of  discriminating knowledge that satisfies Russell’s Principle. As we shall see below, these two 
conditions are individually necessary and jointly sufficient for thinking a singular thought 
about an object. Part Three of  VOR argues for the existence of  Russellian singular terms. 
Evans argues that someone can be in a position to use a singular term to refer to an object 
and say something without being able to think about the object referred to — this latter 
ability is what he often refers to as understanding an utterance, and it is crucial to note that the 
notion of  understanding at play here is a technical one that Evans develops throughout 
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VOR. Evans, elaborating about this distinction between saying and understanding, says: 
 I hold that it is in general a necessary condition for understanding an utterance of  a   
 sentence containing a Russellian referring expression, say ‘a is F,’ that one have a   
 thought, or make a judgement, about the referent, to the effect that it is being said to  
 be F. This is not a necessary condition for making such an utterance in such a way as  
 to say of  the referent that it is F. The divergence arises because of  the possibility   
 that a subject may exploit a linguistic device which he does not himself  properly   
 understand. Given the divergence between the requirements for understanding and the  
 requirements for saying, it would be absurd to deny that our [presumably, those   
 interested in Evans’ project]  primary interest ought to be in the more exigent   
 conditions which are required for understanding. (92, my brackets)  
Evans argues throughout VOR that understanding the thought expressed by an utterance 
containing a Russellian singular terms(s) requires the satisfaction of  Russell’s Principle. 
 
     3.1.2 Evans’ Analysis Of Singular Thought
  
The theory of  singular thought that emerges throughout VOR is dense and nuanced. Part of  
the difficulty in ascertaining Evans’ theory of  singular thought is that the locution ‘singular 
thought’ only appears a handful of  times throughout the entirety of  VOR, mostly in 
connection to a theory of  singular thought that emerged as a result of  several arguments and 
views that Kripke helped pioneer in his influential work, Naming and Necessity (1980). Despite 
the fact that Evans himself  avoids characterizing his own theory as being about singular 
thought, the blurb on the back of  VOR states, “The work is guided by the view that an 
understanding of  how singular thoughts relate to objects is essential for a proper treatment 
of  the linguistic devices by which such thoughts are expressed.” I assume this blurb was 
written by the editor of  VOR, McDowell, who himself  uses the locution ‘singular thought’ 
to mean what Evans means by ‘Russellian thought’ — “a thought that would not be available 
to be thought or expressed if  the relevant object, or objects, did not exist” (McDowell 1982, 
204). This raises the question of  whether or not ‘singular thought’ is what Evans himself  
meant by the locution ‘Russellian thought.’ Additionally, in the contemporary philosophical 
literature, Evans’ position is often characterized as one of  the main theories of  singular 
thought, with Jeshion (2010) going so far as to claim that “to date, the most sustained and 
richest theory containing a principled analysis of  acquaintance as a necessary condition on 
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singular thought can be found in Evans” (14, fn. 33). Therefore, the academic consensus 
largely seems to be that Evans’ develops a theory of  singular thought throughout VOR.  
 The interpretation of  Evans that I wish to argue for is one according to which a 
singular thought (for Evans) is a Russellian thought, the thinking of  which requires the 
satisfaction of  Russell’s Principle. Whereas the idea that Russellian thoughts are singular 
thoughts should be taken as definitional for Evans, the idea that singular thoughts satisfy 
Russell’s Principle should be read as a hypothesis — that is, if  someone is thinking a singular 
thought, then, ex hypothesi, they’re in possession of  discriminating knowledge of  that object. 
In the terminology established previously in Chapter Two, this is to characterize Evans’s 
position as a version of  the Standard View, according to which singular thoughts are (a) 
object dependent [i.e., for Evans, Russellian], and (b) constrained by the satisfaction of  an 
acquaintance condition [i.e., for Evans, Russell’s Principle]. This reading of  Evans will not, I 
hope, be particularly controversial, especially since Evans’ theory of  singular thought is most 
often characterized as a version of  the object-dependent/acquaintance variety.  However, 46
despite this being the way Evans is frequently characterized, the singular thought literature 
lacks any substantial exegetical engagement with the theory of  singular thought that Evans 
argues for throughout VOR, including a detailed account of  why Evans should be interpreted 
this way, and specifically how he should be so interpreted. Most interestingly, despite the lack 
of  this crucially important exegetical work, many contemporary theorists are quick to argue 
that Evans’ theory of  singular thought is incorrect. I will argue that, armed with a proper 
understanding of  Evans’ theory of  singular thought, the contemporary Liberalist critiques 
against Evans are not successful. 
 As we saw in the previous section, one of  the most crucial positions advanced 
throughout VOR is that a number of  singular terms require for their understanding the 
satisfaction of  what Evans calls Russell’s Principle, which states that in order for a subject to 
be credited with a thought about a thing, the subject must be in possession of  information 
that enables them to discriminate (or identify) the object their thought is about.  Critics of  47
 For characterizations of  Evans’ view along these lines, see Bermudez (2005), Jeshion (2010), Dickie (2015), 46
and Goodman and Genone (2020). 
 Throughout VOR Evans discusses a number of  different modes of  identification which he argues are 47
capable of  satisfying Russell’s Principle: descriptive identification, demonstrative identification, recognition-
based identification, and self-identification — though it is also clear that he does not intend this list to be 
exhaustive. Evans devotes entire chapters to demonstrative, recognition-based, and self  identification, but not 
to descriptive-identification, stating that “we have a fairly clear idea of  what description-based identification 
amounts to. But we have a much less clear idea about the other kinds of  identification” (136).
VINDICATING  EVANS       58
Evans often target his defence and application of  Russell’s Principle as a necessary condition 
for having a singular thought. Evans states that, “in order to overthrow Russell’s Principle, 
one would have to show that this general capacity to think of  an object … can be possessed 
entirely in the absence of  any discriminating conception of  that object” (75). This is, in fact, 
the strategy that most opponents of  Evans pursue — including the Liberalist critiques that 
we will consider below.  
 One way to gain a better understanding of  the reasons that motivated Evans to 
defend Russell’s Principle is to understand an attempt to overthrow it that Evans labels ‘The 
Photograph Model of  Mental Representation,’ a theory of  thought that Evans suggests 
emerged from those influenced and inspired by insights from Kripke’s theory of  reference. 
In Naming and Necessity (1980), Kripke argues against the view that the semantical value of  a 
proper name is a uniquely identifying description, as well as the related view that proper 
names refer via their expression of  such descriptions.  One argument against descriptivism 48
that Kripke developed is known as the semantic argument. Let us presume that the only 
description that Polly associates with the name ‘John Lennon’ is the greatest songwriter of  the 
20th century. However, unbeknownst to Polly, the actual object that satisfies this definite 
description is George Gershwin, not John Lennon. Does Polly’s use of  the name ‘John 
Lennon’ refer to John Lennon or George Gershwin? It would appear that the descriptivist 
would have to claim the latter, which Kripke then argues is a modus tollens of  their position.  
 Kripke then attempts to offer “a better picture than the picture presented by the 
received views” (1980, 93). According to Kripke, Polly’s use of  ‘John Lennon’ refers to John 
Lennon in virtue of  a causal chain of  communication, consisting of  semantically parasitic 
uses of  the name ‘Lennon’ to refer to Lennon, that causally terminates in an initial baptismal 
event. The idea is that at some point someone fixed the reference of  the name ‘John 
Lennon,’ perhaps, by holding Julia’s newborn baby in 1940 and uttering “I shall name this 
newborn ‘John Lennon.’” Insofar as Polly’s use of  the name ‘John Lennon’ is causally 
traceable to such a baptismal event (perhaps an omniscient observer is able to do this), then 
this is the metasemantic fact that explains why her use of  ‘John Lennon’ has the semantic 
value that it does — i.e., the referent John Lennon. Kripke states that “it is not how the 
speaker thinks he got the reference, but the actual chain of  communication, which is 
relevant” (93).  
 Kripke develops three main types of  arguments in order to illustrate that the descriptivist thesis of  proper 48
names is false: modal, semantic, and epistemic arguments. However, for the sake of  brevity, I will only outline 
the semantic argument. 
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 Evans suggests that Kripke’s metasemantic explanation as to how a name can be 
used to refer to a particular object inspired some philosophers to argue that perhaps a similar 
metasemantics could be adapted to account for how a subject thinks about a particular object. 
According to Evans, proponents of  the Photograph Model of  Mental Representation 
(hereafter PM)  claim:  49
 The causal antecedents of  the information involved in a mental state, like the causal   
 relation Kripke was concerned with, are claimed to be sufficient to determine which   
 object the state concerns. (The name ‘Photograph Model’ is apt, because we do speak 
 of  a photograph’s being a photograph of  one object rather than another solely on the 
 basis of  which object was related in the appropriate way to its     
 production. (78, his italics) 
and that:  
 What determines which particular object a mental state represents is facts about the   
 mental state’s causal ancestry, quite independent of  anything we could recognize as   
 discriminating knowledge, on the subject’s part, of  the object in question — facts,   
 indeed, of  which the subject himself  may be quite unaware. (83) 
The general argumentative strategy by proponents of  PM is to show that a causal relation to 
the object of  thought is sufficient for someone to have a singular thought about that object, 
despite the fact that Russell’s Principle, which requires discriminating knowledge, remains 
unsatisfied.   50
 In the previous section I noted that Evans argues that it is important to not hastily 
apply results from the theory of  reference to the theory of  thought. After discussing the PM, 
he states that “deliverances of  untutored linguistic intuition may have to be corrected in the 
light of  considerations of  theory” (1982, 76), and that despite the fact that many aspects of  
Kripke’s theory of  reference are fundamentally correct, it cannot just be assumed that they 
apply to thought. Evans claims that “it should be of  interest to see … how few of  the 
fundamentally correct doctrines about reference which have been based on the rejection of  
Russell’s Principle have needed to be so based” (120). Although Kripke’s arguments may 
show that something such as Russell’s Principle does not need to be satisfied in order for 
 In Chapter Two, proponents of  the Photograph Model were referred to as Causal Acquaintance Theorists. 49
 Important early progenitors of  the PM, or related views, are Kaplan (1968), Geach (1969), Donnellan (1970), 50
Devitt (1974), and Harman (1977). For example, Evans notes that in Kaplan (1968), for example, “quite 
independently of  Kripke, the idea had been emerging that causality had some important role to play in 
determining what objects our thoughts and beliefs are about” (77). However, Evans suggests that Kripke’s 
(1980) arguments and influence had the most to do with the development of  the PM. 
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someone to refer to or say something about an object, Evans thinks that without a more fully 
developed theory of  singular thought it is an open question as to whether Kripkean styled 
arguments can show that Russell’s Principle does not need to be satisfied in order for 
someone to think about an object. Evans attempts to illustrate that those aspects of  Kripke’s 
theory of  reference that are fundamentally correct are compatible with a theory of  thought 
that adheres to Russell’s Principle as a necessary condition for thinking about an object.  
 In order to grasp Evans’ theory of  singular thought, it is crucial to understand two 
interrelated notions that he develops throughout VOR.  First, the notion of  ways of  thinking 51
about an object, which Evans calls Ideas.  Ideas are the theoretical entities that are capable of  52
satisfying Russell’s Principle — i.e., if  one has an Idea that enables them to individuate an 
object from all other objects, then the Idea satisfies Russell’s Principle. Second, his notion of  
the informational system, which Evans claims is the ‘substratum of  our cognitive lives’ (122). 
People (and other organisms) are constantly in a state of  receiving, storing, recalling, and 
transmitting information that we receive about the world, and the substratum which unites 
the information received through perception, stored in memory, and transmitted in 
communication is the informational system. Evans argues that there is a certain type of  
thought, ones he calls information based thoughts, that are dependent on the objects from which 
the information derives for their existence — such thoughts are, therefore, Russellian. We 
now have the technical vocabulary that enables us to succinctly state Evans’ theory of  
singular thought.  A subject can be entertain a singular thought if, and only if: 
 (i) the subject has a thought containing an Idea that satisfies Russell’s Principle 
and  
 (ii) the object from which the information derives is the same  as the object identified  
 by that Idea 
In other words, possession of  (a) an Idea of  an object that satisfies Russell’s Principle, and 
(b) information derived from the same object, are individually necessary and jointly sufficient 
 The first notion, that of  Ideas, is the primary subject matter of  Chapter Four in The Varieties of  Reference, 51
while the second notion, that of  the informational system, is the primary subject matter of  Chapter Five. 
 Evans capitalizes the term so as to indicate that he intends to use it as a technical term. He also notes that 52
Ideas cannot be equated with Fregean Senses. Evans says: 
 We cannot equate an Idea (a particular person’s capacity) with a Fregean sense, since the latter is   
 supposed to exist objectively (independently of  anyone’s grasp of  it). But  there is a very close relation 
 between them. Two people exercising their (numerically different) Ideas of  an object many thereby 
 ‘grasp’ the same Fregean sense. What this means is that they may think of  the object in the same way.   
 (104, fn 24)  
This indicates that it is, in fact, problematic to read Evans as himself  being a proponent of  de re senses (as many 
do), since throughout VOR he is primarily concerned with arguing for the existence of  de re Ideas. 
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where x is an object and T is a thought, ST illustrates the way a thought has to be related to 
an object in order for it to be a well grounded singular thought according to Evans. The solid 
arrow represents an informational channel, the channel through which we receive information 
about an object, and is what enables thoughts about the object to be information based. The 
dotted line represents an Idea, or way of  thinking, about an object that enables us to identify 
it. Since in this instance the solid arrow and dotted arrow both involve x, T is a singular 
thought about x. Throughout the remainder of  3.1.2, I will offer some textual evidence for 
this reading of  Evans, as well as illustrating four ways that Evans thinks a thought can fail to 
be singular (which, as we shall see, includes an account of  why the Photograph Model 
discussed above as well as contemporary Liberalist accounts of  singular thought are 
mistaken).  
 Evans introduces his notion of  an information-based thought by describing a kind 
of  thought that is dependent on information one has received from an object:  
 Our particular-thoughts are very often based upon information which we have   
 about the world. We take ourselves to be informed, in whatever way, of  the existence  
 of  such-and-such an object, and we think or speculate about it. A thought of  the   
 kind with which I am concerned is governed by a conception of  its object which is   
 the result neither of  fancy nor of  linguistic stipulation, but rather is the result of  a   
 belief  about how the world is which the subject has because he has received    
 information (or misinformation) from the object. (121) 
For example, imagine Schopenhauer is sitting in his backyard, and, upon receiving 
information through his perceptual faculties, takes himself  to be informed of  a large 
predatory bird that is flying through the sky above him. Schopenhauer remembers this 
episode, and subsequently decides to tell his landlady not to allow his prized poodle out into 
the backyard for fear that that large predatory bird may come and threaten the safety of  the 
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poodle. The landlady then takes herself  to be informed of  the existence of  a large predatory 
bird that may potentially be a threat to the small animals throughout the neighbourhood, and 
she may wonder whether what Schopenhauer saw was a hawk, an eagle, or some other object 
altogether. In both of  these instances, Schopenhauer and the landlady take themselves to be 
informed of  the existence of  an object because of  information they have received — in 
Schopenhauer’s case, by means of  perception, and in the landlady’s case, through testimony. 
Insofar as nothing was amiss (e.g., Schopenhauer’s perceptual faculties were functioning 
normally and he was speaking sincerely to his landlady), we may take them both to be in 
possession of  information derived from the object.  
 Alternatively, it could be the case that Schopenhauer had ingested a rather large dose 
of  psilocybin mushrooms earlier in the day and, unbeknownst to himself, hallucinated the 
bird; or, alternatively, perhaps Schopenhauer, being the bitter pessimist that he is, lied about 
his sighting of  a bird of  prey so as to invoke fear in his landlady. In either of  these scenarios, 
although the subject takes themselves to be informed of  the existence of  such-and-such an 
object because of  information they have received from it they are mistaken: there is no 
object from which the information derives. In the instance in which Schopenhauer was 
hallucinating, it surely seemed to him that he was having an information based thought about a 
bird of  prey. He even took himself  to be in possession of  an Idea, or way of  thinking, about 
it such as that bird up in the sky. However, in this instance we can take Schopenhauer to be 
informed of  the existence of  a concrete object no more than we can objectively consider 
ourselves to be falling out of  bed when we experience an instance of  hypnagogic jerk.  
 According to Evans, information based thoughts are “liable to a quite distinctive 
failing: that of  being ill-grounded (the clearest examples of  this always come when the 
information on which the episode is based has no source)” (134). Evans identifies four ways 
that an information based thought may be ill-grounded, which he illustrates via the following 
diagram: 
VINDICATING  EVANS       63
where x is an object, T is a thought, the line (—) represents that there is no object, the solid 
arrow represents an informational channel, and the dotted line represents an Idea, or a 
purported means of  identifying the object. In the scenarios where Schopenhauer is either 
hallucinating or lying to his landlady, we have an instance of  type (4): there is no object from 
which the information derives, nor is there any object identified by the subject’s Idea. Now, 
modifying our example slightly, imagine that Schopenhauer is lying to his landlady, but that, 
coincidentally, there actually is an eagle flying around the neighbourhood eying potential pets 
to befriend. In this instance, there is no object from which the testimonial information the 
landlady received derives, since Schopenhauer just made it up to traumatize her. However, 
when the landlady proceeds to worry that the bird of  prey may wreck some havoc on the 
neighbourhood pets, is she thinking of  the eagle that happens to actually be flying in the 
vicinity? If  she turns on the local evening news, hears about an eagle attack in her area, and 
thinks to herself, “that eagle flying around our place earlier today is to blame,” does she think 
something true? Evans thinks that, in such an instance, we should be reluctant to say that she 
had thought something true. In this case, we are faced with an instance of  type (3), in which 
the object identified by the Idea is not the same as the one from which the information 
derives.  
 So far, this account of  thoughts of  type (3) and (4) is not problematic for proponents 
of  the Photograph Model, since there is no object from which the information causally 
derives. Their theory would also entail that the subject could not be credited with a singular 
thought about the object. However, Evans thinks that there are instances of  type (1) and (2), 
where the subject is in possession of  information causally derived from an object, but that, 
due to their lack of  an Idea that satisfies Russell’s Principle (or alternatively, one that does 
not locate the same object from which the information derives), they cannot be credited with 
a well grounded singular thought. Evans identifies at least two ways one can have 
information derived from an object while nevertheless being unable to think about said 
object: due to a lack of  uniqueness, and due to what he calls ‘garbling and distortion’ (133).  
 Imagine a scenario where Schopenhauer is sitting in his loft facing a corner that has 
two windows that are perpendicular to one another. He looks out the window on his right, 
and sees an eagle fly upwards into the sky and out of  sight, and then several seconds later 
sees an eagle fly downwards past his left window. He takes himself  to have witnessed the 
flight path of  one eagle. However, unbeknownst to him, he received perceptual information 
derived from two eagles that look identical to one another. Several days later, forgetting that 
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the flight path of  ‘the’ eagle was obstructed by the corner wall between the two windows, he 
reflects to himself  about how majestic that eagle he saw the other day was: which eagle is he 
thinking of? If  we are inclined to ascribe to Schopenhauer a singular thought about one 
eagle over the other, by which means are we to do so? How is this thought content to be 
individuated? Either there is a principled explanation as to why we should take Schopenhauer 
to be thinking of  one eagle over the other (I cannot think of  one),  or Schopenhauer cannot 53
be credited with a singular thought about either eagle. Evans’ explanation for this latter 
conclusion is that Schopenhauer’s Idea, say, that eagle that flew by my window, does not enable 
him to discriminate one eagle from the other, despite the fact that he’s in possession of  
information derived from both eagles. This is an instance of  type (1), in which the subject 
has information derived from an object but does not possess a mode of  identification that 
identifies any object uniquely (therefore failing to satisfy Russell’s Principle).  
 Let’s return to the scenario above with Schopenhauer’s landlady in order to illustrate 
an ill-grounded thought of  type (2). Imagine a scenario where Schopenhauer goes outside, 
looks up, and sees what he takes to be an eagle flying through the sky. However, 
unbeknownst to him, it was a littered promotional tote bag from American Eagle that is 
merely shaped like an eagle. He runs inside and warns his landlady that there is an eagle in 
the area, and that the neighbourhood pets should be carefully supervised. The landlady goes 
around and warns all of  the tenants in the building of  the eagle that is flying around looking 
for unsuspecting prey. However, it turns out that there is, in fact, an eagle in the area. In this 
instance, although her thought is grounded in an information link to an object (i.e., the tote 
bag), and her mode of  identification (i.e., the eagle flying around the neighbourhood) picks out an 
object, Evans thinks that we cannot credit the landlady with a singular thought about either 
the tote bag nor the eagle — the mode of  identification is not related to the subject’s 
informational channel in the right way (an instance of  type 2).  
 So under which circumstances can someone be credited with thinking a singular 
thought about an individual? Evans says that: 
 The notion of  an information-based particular-thought involves a duality of     
 factors: on the one hand, the subject’s possession of  information derived    
 A proponent of  the Photograph Model will claim that whichever eagle is the causal source of  that thought 53
will be enough to individuate it, but this seems like an ad hoc gesture. In this instance, it seems genuinely 
indeterminate as to which eagle the thought is about. Evans attempts to account for this intuition by claiming 
that causal-links are, by themselves, insufficient for determining which object the thought is about. His 
hypothesis is that only through the satisfaction of  Russell’s Principle would the thought be determinately about 
one eagle over the other. 
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 from an object, which he regards as germane to the evaluation and     
 appreciation of  the thought; and, on the other hand, the subject’s satisfaction   
 of  the requirement imposed by Russell’s Principle — his identification of  the   
 object which his thought concerns. (138) 
Evans argues that someone can be credited with a singular thought only if  these two factors 
locate the same object. He elaborates: 
 Finding the target of  an information-based particular-thought would involve tracing   
 back the causal routes by which the relevant information is derived from the relevant  
 object. Finding its object would involve employing the mode of  identification which   
 the subject employs in the thought (exploiting the answer to the question ‘In virtue   
 of  what does the subject know which object his thought concerns?’). Only if  these   
 two procedures locate the same object can the subject be credited with an    
 information-based particular-thought about that object. (139) 




Here, the object identified by the employed mode of  identification is the same as the one 
from which the information derives.  
 As an example of  a successful instance of  ST, let’s consider a case of  demonstrative 
identification, which Evans calls “the mother and father of  all information-based 
thoughts” (145). According to Evans, a demonstrative-thought includes a continual 
informational-link with the object, with the subject’s ability to spatially locate the object 
constituting discriminating knowledge of  the thing (since one way to individuate spatio-
temporal objects is by their spatial location).  Let’s return to the first scenario above where 54
Schopenhauer is sitting in his backyard and spots an eagle flying through the sky. He receives 
perceptual information about the spatial location of  that eagle, and thinks to himself, “that’s 
such a majestic bird.” In this instance, the object identified by his demonstrative that-Idea is 
 Evans develops the notion of  an informational-link so as to replace what he considers to be the vague notion 54
of  perception (see p.144 in particular for developments of  this idea). 
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the same as the object that is the source of  the information, and as such represents a 
successful attempt at tokening a singular thought.  
 What is essential for Evans’ account is an intuition that he shares with proponents of  
the Photograph Model, one that is expressed by Kripke when he states that “it is not how 
the speaker thinks he got the reference, but the actual chain … which is relevant” (1980, 
93).  This ‘outside-in’ model of  cognition is imperative to understanding Evans’ theory of  55
singular thought, as it is the “fact of  an informational connection of  a certain kind, not upon 
the thought or idea of  that connection” that singular thoughts rely on for their aboutness 
(1982, 173).  This dependence on an informational connection is intimately related to why 56
Evans thinks that singular thoughts are Russellian, or object dependent, for if  there is no 
object with which he is connected there is no thought about that object. However, as we have 
seen, Evans thinks that this informational connection is necessary but not sufficient: the way 
of  thinking about the object that the subject employs must also enable them to satisfy 
Russell’s Principle. 
 Demonstrative thoughts are the paradigmatic instances of  singular thought, and as 
Evans puts it, “the difficulty has always been that of  providing a principled way of  
proceeding beyond the demonstrative paradigm” (64). Throughout VOR, Evans attempts to 
illustrate that those instances of  singular thought that go beyond the demonstrative paradigm 
nevertheless share several essential characteristics with it — namely, those provided by ST 
above. To reiterate — a subject can be entertain a singular thought if, and only if: 
 (i) the subject has a thought containing an Idea that satisfies Russell’s Principle 
and  
 (ii) the object from which the information derives is the same  as the object identified  
 by that Idea 
In order to refute the theory of  singular thought that emerges throughout VOR, the 
Liberalist is tasked with refuting both of  the conjuncts. As we shall in the next section, the 
problem with Liberalist critiques is two-fold. First, insofar as they deny (ii), they misidentify 
the explicandum with which Evans was concerned. Evans, like the various singular thought 
theorists before him, was concerned with developing a theory of  object-dependent thought 
 Though Kripke is talking about linguistic reference here, it is this model applied to thought instead which 55
captures the intuition that Evans shares with proponents of  the Photograph Model.
 Evans also expresses this idea using a visual metaphor: “It is the fact that I have my gaze fixed upon a thing, 56
not the idea that I have my gaze fixed upon something, that determines which object is the object of  my 
thought” (173, fn. 44). 
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(de re thought). As we have seen, the only reading of  ‘singular thought’ as a phenomena for 
Evans is one according to which such thoughts are Russellian — and they are Russellian 
because they depend upon an informational channel derived from the object itself. Without 
such an informational channel, it is unclear how a thought is about an actual concrete object 
other than just by ‘fancy or stipulation’ (as Evans would put it) or satisfactionally (as Bach 
(1987) would put it). The Liberalist could still claim that singular thoughts are object 
dependent, but it is unclear to Evans how since their object-involving capacity would merely 
be by luck rather than from being related to the object in the right way. Second, insofar as the 
Liberalist denies (i), which the Photograph Model also denies, then they misevaluate the 
explicandum. It is a hypothesis of  Evans’ theory that instances of  singular thought satisfy 
Russell’s Principle, and the instances of  singular thought that the Liberalist puts forth to 
counter Evans either (a) involve denying (ii) and therefore misidentify the explicandum, or 
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§II Contemporary Liberalism 
     3.2.1 Rejecting Russell’s Principle 
We first encountered Liberalism in Chapter Two — the thesis that there is no general 
acquaintance restriction on singular thought.  The liberalist substantiates this thesis by 57
arguing that there are genuine instances of  singular thought in the absence of  either a causal 
or epistemic acquaintance condition being met. Liberalism has its roots in the semantic 
instrumentalism of  Harman (1977) and Kaplan (1989), according to which we can freely 
manipulate the apparatus of  direct reference in order to produce singular thoughts about 
objects we would otherwise be unable to think about.  However, although it is historically 58
rooted in semantic instrumentalism, it is important to note that liberalism is the broadest 
rejection of  an acquaintance condition, and encompasses several distinct views besides 
semantic instrumentalism (e.g., Jeshion’s cognitivism).  For our purposes, what matters most 59
is that all liberals are committed to a rejection of  Evans’ defence of  Russell’s Principle. 
 The strategy that I will be pursuing throughout the remainder of  Chapter Three is 
the following. First, in 3.2.1 I will briefly explain semantic instrumentalism and the claim that 
descriptively introduced referential terms (DIRTs) can be used to generate acquaintanceless 
singular thought ‘on the cheap.’ DIRTs give rise to a semantic argument against Evans’ 
theory of  singular thought that I’ll call the argument from semantic content accessibility — 
one of  the primary argumentative strategies that philosophers have used against Evans (for 
two notable and more recent examples, see Borg 2007 and Hawthorne and Manley 2012). I 
will then proceed to outline Jeshion’s cognitivism, a descendent of  semantic instrumentalism, 
which attempts to overcome semantic instrumentalism’s perceived shortcomings while 
nevertheless still attempting to overthrow Russell’s Principle. What is distinctive about 
Jeshion’s cognitivism is that it opposes Evans’ theory independently of  any semantical 
considerations. The general argument is that cognitivism is a superior theory of  singular 
thought when compared to acquaintance based accounts. Second, in 3.2.2, on the behalf  of  
 Some of  the most notable liberalists include Harman (1977), Kaplan (1989), Sainsbury (2005), Borg (2007), 57
Jeshion (2010), and Hawthorne and Manley (2012). 
 A few of  the most prominent semantic instrumentalists have since changed their mind. Kaplan (2012) has 58
abandoned semantic instrumentalism in favour of  an acquaintance condition that he derives from Donnellan, 
while Soames (2002) claims that although Kripke was once a semantic instrumentalist, he too has since given up 
the position.   
 Whereas semantic instrumentalism entails liberalism, liberalism does not entail semantic instrumentalism. 59
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Evans, I will illustrate the ways in which semantic instrumentalist and cognitivist arguments 
fall short of  refuting Evans’ theory of  singular thought.  
 In the preceding sections, we saw how Kripke’s semantical analysis of  proper names 
was in part what facilitated the development of  the Photograph Model. However, Kripke’s 
insights also helped facilitate the development of  semantic instrumentalism — a view that is 
quite antithetical to the Photograph Model. Kaplan (1989) argues that: 
 A special form of  knowledge of  an object is neither required nor presupposed in   
 order that a person may entertain as object of  thought a singular proposition   
 involving that object … What allows us to take various propositional attitudes   
 towards singular propositions is not the form of  our acquaintance with the object   
 but is rather our ability to manipulate the conceptual apparatus of  direct reference.   
 (536) 
For example, adapting an example from Kaplan, suppose I fix the referent of  the name 
‘Stella-1’ with an attributively used definite description such as the 25th furthest super-
inhabitable planet from Earth. The semantics of  direct reference suggests that my use of  
‘Stella-1’ now refers to the 25th furthest super-inhabitable planet from Earth (presuming it 
exists). It seems that I can now meaningfully assert counterfactuals about Stella-1, such as 
claiming that it could have been the 15th furthest super-inhabitable planet instead. Since I am 
able to meaningfully understand assertions about Stella-1, it seems like a natural step to claim 
that I am also able to think about Stella-1, despite an acquaintance condition remaining 
unsatisfied. It seems as if  our ability to manipulate the apparatus of  direct reference is 
capable of  influencing our cognition, with Kaplan (1989) claiming that DIRTs “constitute a 
form of  cognitive restructuring; they broaden the range of  thought” (560). Proper names 
introduced in this manner are known as descriptive names, and constitute one of  the primary 
avenues that liberalists pursue in order to overthrow acquaintance conditions, since 
descriptive names and other DIRTs seem to entail that there are acquaintanceless singular 
thoughts.   60
 In Chapter Two, we considered several conceptions of  singular thought and noted 
that any theory of  singular thought ought to be able to account for both the contribution 
and the mechanism of  such thoughts. The Standard View is one according to which the 
satisfaction of  some sort of  causal or epistemic condition enables someone to grasp a 
 Besides descriptive names, similar arguments can be developed using dthat expressions and deferred 60
demonstratives. Other notable examples of  descriptive names in the literature include Kripke’s (1980) ‘Jack the 
Ripper’ and ‘Neptune,’ as well as Evans’ (1982) ‘Julius.’ 
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singular content — this latter ability being what demarcates singular from general thought(s). 
Semantic instrumentalism puts pressure on the Standard View because it attempts to show 
that all that is required for singular thought about an object is the mental tokening of  a name 
that refers to that object. This seems to imply that the Standard View gets the mechanism 
story wrong, since one can mentally token a name that refers to an object without being 
acquainted with the object referred to through a use of  that name. Therefore, semantic 
instrumentalism strongly suggests that if  we countenance that a descriptively introduced 
singular term is capable of  expressing a singular content, then understanding utterances 
containing that DIRT is sufficient for a subject to grasp a singular content, thereby enabling 
the subject to have a singular thought about that object. To come at the point another way, 
Jeshion (2010) writes that “sentence-understanding should be sufficient for grasping what 
the sentence expresses” (111). This link between sentence understanding and grasping the 
thought expressed has been labelled semantic content accessibility (SCA).  Jeshion (2002) 61
elaborates that according to SCA: 
 For all expressions E in the language L, and all sentences S in L expressing some   
 proposition P, if  an agent A has semantical understanding of  all the expressions E   
 contained in S, then if  A were apprised of  all the relevant contextual information, A   
 could have an attitude having P as its content. (61)   
Liberalists argue that Evans’ view commits him to a denial of  SCA, which they argue is a 
modus tollens of  his position. For example, according to Hawthorne and Manley (2012), “The 
claim that people commonly express propositions that no one can grasp generates tension 
with the natural idea that meanings of  utterances are — in some fairly direct way — parasitic 
on the contents they are used to communicate” (24). The argument from semantic content 
accessibility constitutes one of  the primary ways that Liberalists have attempted to 
undermine Evans’ theory of  singular thought (we will consider this reading of  Evans, and 
whether it is problematic for his position, in section 3.2.2 below).  62
 Whereas semantic instrumentalism attempts to overthrow Russell’s Principle by 
analyzing the semantical behaviour of  singular terms and their influence on cognition, 
Jeshion (2002, 2010) builds on the insight that ‘mental names sustain singular thought’ and 
develops a view she calls cognitivism that can exist independently of  semantical 
considerations. This is a potentially more powerful way to refute Evans’ theory of  singular 
 See Kripke (1978), Jeshion (2002), and Goodman (2018) for discussions of  semantic content accessibility. 61
 For criticisms of  Evans alone these lines, see Jeshion (2002), Borg (2007), and Hawthorne and Manley (2012).62
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thought, since even if  we grant Evans’ denial of  SCA his theory may be inadequate 
regardless of  its implications for semantics.  
 Cognitivism is Jeshion’s view that singular thought is (a) constitutively from and 
through a mental file, and (b) subject to a significance condition. Concerning singular 
thought and mental files, she writes: 
 One thinks a singular thought by thinking through or via a mental file that one has   
 about the particular object. By contrast, descriptive thoughts occur discretely in   
 cognition, disconnected from any mental file. Such thoughts play a role in inferential   
 relations, but there is no special organizational structure that governs their    
 occurrence in cognition … On the view I am proposing, thinking of  individuals   
 from mental files is constitutive of  singular thoughts. We think singular thoughts   
 about individuals if  and only if  we think of  them through a mental file. (2010,   
 129-130, her italics)  
The gist of  the idea is that when Schopenhauer’s landlady thinks of  the eagle as the bird of  
prey surveying the neighbourhood, she is thinking of  the eagle through a mental file that binds 
together any predicative information she may have about it (e.g., that it’s an eagle, that it’s 
within the geographical vicinity, that it has a finite lifespan, etc). Importantly, however, the 
descriptive content she stores in her eagle-file is (a) distinct from the file itself, and (b) 
capable of  mischaracterizing the eagle (e.g., her eagle-file still retains its identity criterion 
even it some of  the descriptive content is incorrect, insofar as the majority of  the 
information stored within it is predicable of  that eagle). 
 The general idea behind the cognitivist framework is that “what distinguishes de re 
thought is its structural or organizational role in thought; acquaintance, and any evidential or 
epistemic relation, is inessential” (Jeshion 2002, 67). What is unique about the cognitive role 
of  singular thought is that it employs mental files, which can be characterized by three 
primary functions they serve for cognition: a bundling-function, an identity-function, and a 
singularity-function. Whereas the first two functions are common to most conceptions of  
mental files, the singularity-function is unique to cognitivism: “thinking about an individual 
from a mental file is constitutive of  singular thinking about that individual” (132). Jeshion is 
explicit that her claim that singular thought is thought from and through a mental file should 
not be read as shifting the topic or as marking new terminology, it should be interpreted “as 
a theoretical conjecture or stance on the nature of  mental files and singular thought” (130). 
For example, if  Schopenhauer is thinking a singular thought about an eagle in the sky, it is 
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only because he is thinking through a mental file, and not because he is entertaining an object 
dependent content or in possession of  information derived from the object.  
 Besides the view that thinking of  individuals through mental files is constitutive of  
singular thought, the second main feature of  cognitivism is that the formation of  a mental 
file is subject to a significance condition. According to the significance condition, “a mental 
file is initiated on an individual only if  that individual is significant to the agent with respect 
to her plans, projects, affective states, motivations” (ibid., 136). Jeshion claims that “cognition 
does not withhold from forming mental files and mental names on individuals simply 
because of  the presence or even the awareness of  a gap in our epistemic relation to the 
object of  thought. Cognition is, rather sensitive to significance” (2010, 21). Only if  the 
significance condition is satisfied will cognition open a mental file for an object. For example, 
say Schopenhauer is reading an article in the paper on the ever increasing eagle population in 
Frankfurt, and how one particular eagle, Baldy, is the most dangerous. Surely it is significant 
to his aims (e.g., protecting his prized poodle) that he can track the information about Baldy 
that the article is conveying (perhaps flight routines, times in which Baldy tends to prey, etc.). 
It is important that Schopenhauer, for example, track that they are talking about the same 
eagle, and that instances of  anaphora throughout the article refer back to Baldy, and so on. 
Jeshion argues that the way Schopenhauer does this is by the formation of  a mental file, in 
this case, his Baldy-file. Additionally, Jeshion claims that the “significance condition on 
singular thought replaces an acquaintance condition on singular thought” (ibid., 136).  
 Jeshion’s cognitivism represents one of  the most thoroughly developed Liberalist 
alternatives to the Standard View on singular thought precisely because it offers as an 
explanation as to both the contribution and mechanism of  singular thought. Jeshion’s 
significance condition is an account of  the mechanism of  singular thought, while the mental 
files themselves are an account of  what is contributed in thinking a singular thought. In this 
sense it could be said that whereas most varieties of  Liberalism are destructive in nature, 
demonstrating why we should not be Standard Theorists, Cognitivism is constructive in 
nature, offering us a more fully developed alternative that is potentially capable of  
accounting for the same explicandum as the Standard Theory. Jeshion’s cognitivism is the 
perfect foil to Evans’ theory of  singular thought, since she disagrees with Evans’ account of  
both the mechanism and the contribution of  thinking singularly. 
 The significance condition also enables us to see what distinguishes cognitivism from 
semantic instrumentalism. Jeshion states that the production of  mental names is not under 
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agential control, but rather cognition’s control (2010, 125). She argues that we cannot simply 
introduce a DIRT at will and thereby come to have singular thoughts about its referent; 
rather, only when an individual is significant to an agent can that agent have a singular thought 
about that individual. Most objections to the plausibility of  DIRTs rest on intuitions that we 
cannot just freely choose to refer to (or think about) a thing by exploiting some attributively 
used definite description to fix the referent of  a singular term. Jeshion’s cognitivism attempts 
to respect these intuitions against DIRTs by arguing that agents cannot just enter new belief  
states at will with the ‘stroke of  a pen.’ However, Jeshion argues that it is a false dilemma to 
think that if  we deny the ‘free name introduction’ of  traditional semantic instrumentalism we 
must therefore be acquaintance theorists. 
 There are a number of  other distinctive features about the cognitivist framework that 
are in its favour — most of  which are purportedly problems for Evans’ theory. First, many 
philosophers have held that we are capable of  having singular thoughts about objects that we 
are neither causally nor epistemically related to. Cognitivism accounts for this by arguing that 
an object may satisfy the significance condition in ways that do not involve epistemic or 
causal features. Second, a major complaint that has been raised against both the content and 
relational conceptions of  singular thought is that they entail that singular thoughts are object 
dependent, preventing the possibility of  object independent thought. Cognitivism overcomes 
this perceived difficulty because what is distinctive about singular thought is not that it is 
characterized relationally or in terms of  singular content, but rather that the agent is thinking 
from and through a mental file. My Santa-Claus-file, for example, contains quite a bit of  
descriptive content that my childhood self  thought was uniquely co-instantiated by some 
object, and such a file was subject to a significance condition (‘the jolly man that drives an 
airborne sleigh and leaves gifts in exchange for cookies and milk’ is surely a descriptive 
statement that would be significant to a child's affective state(s)). Third, it is thought that the 
cognitivist framework provides an account of  singular thought that is more empirically 
respectable than the existing alternatives. The mental file terminology has also been utilized 
in cognitive science and linguistics, and therefore seems like a more empirically tractable kind 
of  phenomena. When we discuss mental files, we are talking about something that is 
theoretically individuated via features that are intrinsic to the mental, and, as such, 
presumably a phenomena that is capable of  eventually being studied in a controlled 
experimental setting. Contrast this with the notion that singular thought is an attitude 
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towards an object dependent content — how are we to parse this notion out in terms that 
would be more experimentally tractable?   
 That being said, despite all of  the reasons in favour of  cognitivism, there are a 
number of  issues with the view. Firstly, are there actually object independent singular 
thoughts? Evans, as we have seen, takes the object dependent aspect of  singular thoughts to 
be almost definitional — singular thoughts just are object-dependent thoughts. This is in line 
with the history of  the singular thought literature going all the way back to Russell. Perhaps, 
then, cognitivists could be charged with the philosophic crime of  equivocation, or with 
misidentifying the explicandum, as a number of  philosophers have recently urged.  63
However, Jeshion herself  states that the claim that thinking of  individuals through mental 
files is constitutive of  singular thought “should not be understood as marking new 
terminology (i.e., my claim is not “what I mean by ‘mental file’ is an organizational structure 
from which singular thought is achieved”). The claim should rather be construed as a 
theoretical conjecture or stance on the nature of  mental files and singular thought” (130, my 
italics). So much for the attempt to charge the cognitivist of  the lesser crime of  talking past 
their opponent! Second, the cognitivist motivates their view by arguing that the condition 
that needs to be satisfied in order for someone to have a singular thought is not causal or 
epistemic, but is instead the significance condition. However, Evans (1982) thinks that in 
order to think of  an object, one must satisfy what he calls Russell’s Principle. If  we can 
demonstrate that Russell’s Principle is, in fact, satisfied in the thought experiments the 
cognitivist uses to substantiate their position, then we shall have demonstrated that this in 
and of  itself  does not constitute a rebuttal to Evans’ view. We could then argue that the 
cognitivist is guilty of  misevaluating the explicandum. Lastly, it remains to be determined 
how literally the file metaphor should be taken. More needs to be said on what constitutes 
thought from and through a mental file, how mental files are to be empirically studied, how 
they fit into the general models of  the mind of  contemporary cognitive science, psychology, 
and neuroscience, and what mental files themselves are. As Goodman and Genone (2020) 
ask, “is it indeed the case that there is a unified cognitive, functional kind posited by 
psychologists, linguists, and philosophers when they employ the notion of  a ‘file’?” (10).  
 See, for example, King (2020), Reimer (2020), Pepp (2020), and Sainsbury (2020), who each argue, in their 63
distinctive way, that many of  the contemporary debates about singular thought do not constitute genuine 
disagreement due to the fact that the various interlocutors are guilty of  talking past one another. 
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 In the next section, I will proceed to vindicate Evans from both the argument from 
semantic content accessibility and cognitivism.  
     3.2.2 Vindicating Evans
In 3.1.2, I reconstructed the theory of  singular thought that emerges throughout The Varieties 
of  Reference. According to this reading of  Evans, a subject can entertain a singular thought if, 
and only if: 
 (i) the subject has a thought containing an Idea that satisfies Russell’s Principle 
and 
 (ii) the object from which the information derives is the same as the object identified  
 by that Idea  
In the previous section(s), I outlined the Liberalist thesis that there is no general 
acquaintance constraint on singular thought. Liberalists are committed to a denial of  both of  
these conjuncts, since they are both versions of  a general acquaintance condition. One of  the 
most prominent strategies used by Liberalists to deny (ii) is to illustrate how we can generate 
singular thoughts ‘on the cheap’ by manipulating the apparatus of  direct reference — in 
absentia of  any informational channel derived from the object of  thought.  Liberalists argue 64
that Evans’ attempts to avoid this maneuver commits him to a rejection of  the principle of  
semantic content accessibility, which they then argue constitutes a modus tollens of  his 
position. Another prominent Liberalist strategy, developed by Jeshion (2002, 2010), is to 
argue that cognitivism is a superior theory of  singular thought when compared to any 
acquaintance based account. Evans’ theory is a version of  the Standard Theory, according to 
which singular thoughts are both object dependent and require for their tokening the 
satisfaction of  an acquaintance condition, in this instance Russell’s Principle. Cognitivism 
opposes the Standard Theory’s characterization of  singular thought by arguing that it should 
instead be characterized by its functional role in cognition, which is best understood as 
thought from and through a mental file. These files are initiated only if  an object is 
significant to cognition. Cognitivism is, therefore, an attempt at a wholesale rejection of  
Evans’ theory of  singular thought, since it attempts to deny (i) and (ii) simultaneously. 
Throughout this section, I will argue that these Liberalist critiques of  Evans fail because they 
either misidentify or misevaluate the phenomena with which Evans was concerned.  
 See Jeshion (2002), Borg (2007), and Hawthorne and Manley (2012). 64
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 Evans’ (1979) often quoted remark that “we do not get ourselves into new belief  
states by ‘the stroke of  a pen’ (in Grice’s phrase) — simply by introducing a name into the 
language” (202) is a prime expression of  his reluctance to allow descriptive names to be 
genuine sources of  novel singular thought about an object. Evans was well aware of  
semantic instrumentalism and the threat it posed for his advocacy of  Russell’s Principle (see 
1982, 74). In section 3.1.1, we saw that one of  the main themes throughout VOR is that we 
must remain skeptical of  attempts to apply conclusions from the theory of  reference to the 
theory of  thought: semantic instrumentalism represents one of  these attempts. Evans gets us 
to consider the descriptive name ‘Julius,’ introduced into the language via the definite 
description the inventor of  the zip. Evans claims that although descriptive names very rarely 
occur naturally in language, “it would appear to be always possible to create descriptive 
names by stipulation, as we envisaged ‘Julius’ to have been introduced into the 
language” (49). Two questions about descriptive names are (a) whether or not such names 
should be considered as referring expressions, and (b) whether or not such names are 
capable of  generating novel singular thoughts about an object. As we will see, although 
Evans and the semantic instrumentalists are in agreement about (a), they are in disagreement 
in regards to (b).  
 Evans agrees with Russell’s analysis of  definite descriptions (see Chapter Two), 
according to which definite descriptions are not genuine members of  the category of  
referential terms. On a Russellian analysis, what is semantically expressed by an utterance of  
a sentence containing a definite description is not a singular proposition, but is a 
quantificational claim that there is some property that is uniquely instantiated. However, 
Evans, in agreement with many of  the fundamental points of  Kripke’s (1980) semantical 
analysis of  proper names, disagrees with the Russellian analysis of  ordinary proper names as 
disguised definite descriptions. The referentialist analysis of  a descriptive name such as 
‘Julius’ would seem to suggest that it is a rigid designator, referring to the same object in all 
possible worlds in which that object exists. Evans agrees with this analysis, claiming that “if  
there is a unique inventor of  the zip, then ‘Julius’ refers to that person, and in exactly the same 
sense as that in which a Russellian name refers to its bearer” (50, his italics).  
 So how does Evans’ analysis of  descriptive names differ from semantic 
instrumentalism? Even though Evans is willing to grant that such names are referring 
expressions, he thinks that they are not Russellian singular terms since they do not require the 
existence of  a referent for their understanding. Examples of  Russellian singular terms for 
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Evans include demonstratives, indexicals, and ordinary proper names, where, put crudely, no 
referent equals no understanding. Descriptive names, on the other hand, are non-Russellian 
singular terms — i.e., they do not require the existence of  a referent for their understanding. 
Evans claims that, unlike ordinary proper names, knowledge of  the role of  the referent 
fixing description is required in order to understand uses of  descriptive names. He claims 
that: 
 In the case of  descriptive names there is a public, semantical connection between the  
 name and the description: the sense of  the name is such that an object is determined  
 to be the referent of  the name if  and only if  it satisfies a certain description. Anyone  
 who understands the name must be aware of  the reference-fixing role of  the   
 description. (48) 
If  someone is unaware of  the reference-fixing role of  the description, then it seems difficult 
to see the sense in which they understand the name — since, by stipulation, the name only 
refers to whichever object satisfies the descriptive content. Unlike ordinary metasemantic 
baptisms, in which a description may be referentially used to fix the referent, in the case of  
descriptive names the description is being used attributively. There is no independent means 
through which to think of  the referent, and, most importantly, no channel through which to 
receive information about the object.  
 Say, for example, that ‘Julius’ turns out to be an empty name after all. On a standard 
referentialist analysis, utterances containing it would fail to have a meaning, given the 
principle of  compositionality and the standard referentialist analysis of  proper names.  Evans 
argues that ordinary proper names, those not introduced by stipulation, do indeed function 
in this way. If  there is no object referred to by a use of  a name, then there is no sense of  
understanding that name.  However, Evans claims that even if  ‘Julius’ turns out to be empty, 65
 A common objection to this point is that there seems to be a definitive sense in which the name ‘Santa Claus’ 65
can be understood despite the fact that it is empty. However, if  we are to presume a general referentialist 
treatment of  proper names, according to which proper names semantically contribute their referent to the 
proposition expressed by utterances containing them, it is difficult to see how to reconcile our intuitions about 
being able to understand names such as ‘Santa Claus’ within such a framework.  
 
There seem to be two general options available for the referentialist: (1) ‘Santa Claus’ does, in fact, refer — 
however, it doesn’t refer to an actually existing concrete object, but either a Meinongian, abstract, or possible 
object; or (2) fictional names such as ‘Santa Clause’ function rather differently than ordinary proper names, and 
they either contribute a metalinguistic description to the proposition, or our use of  them occurs with the scope 
of  a pretence. The latter is the route that Evans (1982) pursues in order to accommodate our intuitions about 
the meaningfulness of  empty names. However, all of  these options are littered with philosophical difficulties 
(see Hurry 2016). The meaningfulness of  purported empty or fictional names is a global difficulty that all 
referentialist analyses of  proper names face — it is not a problem that only uniquely arises for Evans theory. 
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there is still a sense in which the thought expressed by ‘Julius is F’ is the same as the thought 
expressed by ‘the inventor of  the zip is F,’ despite the fact that ‘Julius’ and ‘the inventor of  
the zip’ behave differently within the scope of  intensional operators. Since definite 
descriptions do not require a referent in order for utterances containing them to be 
meaningful, Evans suggests the same applies to descriptive names. Evans elaborates: 
 In saying that the thought expressed by ‘Julius is F’ may equivalently be expressed by 
 ‘The inventor of  the zip is F,’ I think I am conforming to common sense. Someone   
 who understands and accepts the one sentence as true gets himself  into exactly the   
 same belief  state as someone who accepts the other. Belief  states are distinguished   
 by the evidence which gives rise to them, and the expectations, behaviour, and   
 further beliefs which may be derived from them (in conjunction with other beliefs);   
 and in all these respects, the belief  states associated with the two sentences are   
 indistinguishable. (50) 
Evans is here appealing to the notion that anyone who understands a descriptive name must 
be aware of  the reference-fixing role of  the description in order to substantiate his functional 
analysis of  belief  states in the quoted passage above.  
 In 3.1.2 we considered a passage from VOR in which Evans explains the type of  
thought with which he is concerned: 
 Our particular-thoughts are very often based upon information which we have about  
 the world. We take ourselves to be informed, in whatever way, of  the existence of    
 such-and-such an object, and we think or speculate about it. A thought of  the kind   
 with which I am concerned is governed by a conception of  its object which is the   
 result neither of  fancy nor of  linguistic stipulation, but rather is the result of  a belief    
 about how the world is which the subject has because he has received information (or misinformation) 
 from the object. (121, my italics)  
As I noted above, in the case of  descriptive names there is no independent means through 
which to think of  the referent, and, most importantly, no channel through which to receive 
information about the object. It is, therefore, challenging to see how such thoughts could be 
information based. However, as established in 3.1.2, a singular thought for Evans just is a 
thought that is Russellian (object dependent), and the Russellian status of  such thoughts was 
explained in terms of  their being information based. The semantic instrumentalist argues 
that we can introduce novel singular thoughts about an object by introducing a name by 
stipulation, but it is difficult to ascertain the sense in which such a name is capable of  
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expressing a Russellian thought — especially if  Evans is right in his suggestion that such 
names are not even themselves Russellian singular terms. While discussing the ways in which 
descriptive thoughts are different than information based thoughts, Evans claims that:  
 Essaying of  information-based, then, are liable to a quite distinctive failing: that of    
 being ill-grounded (the clearest examples of  this always come when the information   
 on which the episode is based has no source). It follows that even when the mode of    
 identification employed exploits individuating facts about an object, an information-based   
 thought cannot be regarded as working like a descriptive thought (of  which thoughts  
 that would be expressed with the name ‘Julius’ were our paradigm examples). An   
 information-based thought has a liability which corresponds to nothing in the case   
 of  a pure descriptive thought. (134-135, his italics) 
Furthermore, since the belief  states generated by our use of  descriptive names seem to be 
functionally equivalent to those generated by our use of  the description used to fix the 
referent, and, since the latter are paradigmatic instances of  descriptive thought, it is hard to 
see why the mere association of  a name with that description would somehow be sufficient 
to enable someone to generate a novel singular thought.   
 If  the semantic instrumentalist is unable to explain the process through which DIRT 
introduction enables one to not only express a singular content, but also entertain an object 
dependent thought, then it would appear that they are possibly interested in a phenomena 
quite distinct from that which interested Evans. Reimer (2020) has recently argued along 
these lines that the drift between semantic instrumentalists (e.g., Kaplan) and Evans does not 
constitute a genuinely substantive debate. According to Reimer: 
 The two philosophers are arguing past one another insofar as they appear to be   
 interested in different phenomena. Thus, while Evans is interested in mental states,   
 beliefs in particular, Kaplan is interested in semantic contents. Perhaps, then, Evans is   
 right in thinking that descriptive names are not a potential source of  novel singular   
 mental states, while Kaplan is right in thinking that such expressions are a potential   
 source of  novel singular semantic contents.” (50, her italics)  
As an example of  a divergence between semantic contents and mental states, Reimer asks us 
to consider an instance where you are standing in the middle of  a store, close your eyes, 
point to a stack of  magazines in the corner, and utter, “I am going to buy that one.” There 
seems to be a sense in which you both do and do not understand what you have just said — 
you realize you have plausibly expressed a semantic content, but you do not know which 
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content you have expressed until you open your eyes. Perhaps the store clerk witnessed the 
entire episode, and is herself  able to apprehend the singular thought you have expressed 
before you are able to. Understood in this way, the Liberalist attempts to overthrow Evans’ 
theory of  singular thought by an appeal to DIRTs is a result of  misidentifying the 
explicandum with which Evans was concerned: object dependent thought.  
 Perhaps surprisingly, even semantic instrumentalists themselves seem to characterize 
their stance on singular thought and singular content in a way that is quite bizarre if  we do 
not read them as being interested in distinct phenomena from the one that interested Evans. 
Consider the following passage from Borg (2007): 
 I’m going to reject wholesale the idea that there are epistemic (or indeed any other   
 substantial) kinds of  constraint on singular content. The claim will be that, whatever   
 is special about having a singular thought, it is not to be explained in terms of  the   
 kind of  relationship an agent has with an object. This, then, will be one instance of    
 the more general advocacy of  minimal semantics, for it will thus turn out that it is no 
 job of  a semantic theory to tell us, in any substantial way, which objects in the world   
 expressions hook up to, nor indeed whether or not certain expressions succeed in   
 hooking up with an object at all. Finding out this sort of  thing is a task which goes well   
 beyond the remit of  the language faculty. (169, my italics)  
Notice the way that Borg switches between her use of  ‘semantic content’ and ‘singular 
thought,’ while claiming that finding out ‘which objects in the world’ expressions hook up to 
goes well beyond the remit of  the language faculty. From Evans’ perspective, this is the exact 
kind of  seesawing between language and thought that he advises us to be wary of. Evans’ 
theory of  singular thought is entirely congruent with the notion that the task described by 
Borg goes well beyond the language faculty — but that is precisely why he thinks we need a 
theory of  singular thought! If  that is not the task that a theory of  singular thought is 
attempting to carry out, then it problematic to read Evans and Borg (and other semantic 
instrumentalists) as unequivocally talking about the same phenomena when they use the 
expression ‘singular thought.’  
 Jeshion’s cognitivism is a Liberalist position that is skeptical towards some of  the 
intuitions that drive semantic instrumentalism. In the previous section, I noted that she 
thinks an agent cannot simply introduce a DIRT at will and thereby come to have a singular 
thought about its referent — according to her theory, only when an individual is significant 
to an agent can that agent have a singular thought about that individual. The explanation is 
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that only when an individual is significant does cognition initiate the opening of  a mental file, 
and singular thought is claimed to be thought from and through such files. By rejecting the 
‘free name introduction’ of  traditional semantic instrumentalists, Jeshion’s cognitivism 
presents itself  as a more powerful Liberalist objection to acquaintance accounts such as 
Evans’, since it is not subject to the same difficulties, nor does it rest on the same semantical 
considerations, as semantic instrumentalism. Instead, Jeshion sets cognitivism up as a better 
theory of  singular thought qua theory of  singular thought.  
 There are several misgivings I would like to express about cognitivism. They can be 
grouped into two primary categories. The first category involves the conception of  mental 
files as being constitutive of  singular thought. Evans’ theory can quite naturally 
accommodate the mental files framework. In fact, there is a notion of  mental files at play 
within VOR that Evans calls ‘controlling conceptions of  an object.’ It is Jeshion’s 
characterization of  mental files as serving a singular-function that Evans would object to — 
and, as we will see, Jeshion’s identification of  singular thought as mental files leaves her 
susceptible to the argument that she is misidentifying the explicandum. The second category 
involves the significance condition that Jeshion argues must be satisfied in order for a mental 
file to be initiated (i.e., a singular thought). Her significance condition is an attempt to make 
her theory more agreeable compared to a more liberal semantic instrumentalism, yet the 
account of  cases she countenances as satisfying the significance condition is so broad that 
the theory borders on the unpalatable. In this sense cognitivism is guilty of  misevaluating the 
explicandum. I will now consider each of  these objections in turn.  
 Jeshion (2010) claims that mental files can be characterized as serving three primary 
functions. First, the identity-function: each mental file is “a repository of  information that 
the agent takes to be about a single individual” (131). I may, for example, have a Frege-file, 
and each time I think through this Frege-file, I take myself  to be thinking of  the same object. 
Second, the bundling-function: mental files are “vehicles for bundling together an agent’s 
fund of  information about a particular individual,” and “provide an economical and efficient 
means of  sorting, retrieving, and adding information on a particular individual” (131). 
Imagine I am reading the preface to Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, and, upon 
reading the name ‘Frege,’ my Frege-file is triggered in cognition and I store the information 
that Frege was an influence on Wittgenstein within this folder. Several weeks later, I may be 
reading through a logic textbook, and yet again encounter the name ‘Frege.’ I may then 
reopen the same Frege-file as before and now store information in it about Frege’s 
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significance for the development of  predicate calculus. Lastly, Jeshion argues that although 
most mental file theorists take identity and bundling to be the only basic functions of  mental 
files, there is a third function that has hitherto gone unrecognized. According to the singular-
function, “thinking about an individual from a mental file is constitutive of  singular thinking 
about that individual” (132).   
 Evans (1982) is one of  those theorists that recognizes only bundling and identity 
functions for mental files. Part of  the substratum of  the informational system is what Evans 
calls controlling conceptions, which can be thought of  as dossiers or mental files. According 
to Evans, one of  the central features of  our system of  gathering information from 
individuals is “the fact that we group pieces of  information together, as being from the same 
object — that we collect information lines into bundles” (126). Evans would resist Jeshion’s 
claim that mental files can be further characterized by a singular-function, since it is not 
thought from and through a mental file that is constitutive of  singular thought, but is rather 
the Russellian status of  such thoughts. It is only when the object identified by the Idea the 
subject employs in thinking about an object is the same as the object from which the 
information derives that the subject can be credited with thinking a singular thought (see 
3.1.2 above). Evans would recognize the importance of  the functional role of  mental files in 
cognition, yet he would also think that singular thought cannot be categorized by functional 
role alone.  
 There are two concepts that Evans (1973) develops that are helpful in seeing why the 
singular-function is an inadequate characterization of  singular thought: source and 
dominance. Information we take to be co-instantiated by an object is stored together in the 
same mental file. The first question we can ask about any given piece of  information is about 
its source. In an ideal circumstance, the information we receive is true of  same object that 
our Idea designates. However, there are also instances in which (a) the information is 
sourceless, or (b) the object that is source of  the information is different than the object 
identified by our Idea (we considered cases such as these above). The second question we 
can ask about information is which object is the information dominantly about. Evans thinks 
that “a cluster or dossier of  information can be dominantly of  an item though it contains 
elements whose source is different” (16) — for example, in the cases in which there is a shift 
in reference and/or misidentification of  an object.  
 Consider our previous example where Schopenhauer identifies that eagle in the sky 
and thinks that it represents a possible threat to his prized poodle. In this simple example, 
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Schopenhauer may open a mental file on that eagle, which we can label as his Baldy-file. In 
the scenario where he had ingested psilocybin mushrooms and was hallucinating, the 
information stored in his Baldy-file is sourceless. Yet he is still thinking through an 
occasioned mental file. The next afternoon, he may be out in his yard again, and upon 
looking up, spots an eagle. Taking himself  (erroneously) to be re-identifying the same eagle, 
he stores information he is receiving about that eagle within his Baldy-file. Let’s presume he 
re-identifies this same eagle over a span of  several weeks and continues to amass greater 
amounts of  information about it. Here we would have an instance in which the information 
stored in a file is dominantly of  an object that is not the source of  the file. The difficultly 
with cognitivism’s singular-function is that Schopenhauer’s thought from and through his 
Baldy-file is definitionally singular in each instance where (a) he is not thinking of  any object 
(since there is no object from which the information is derived), and (b) he is thinking of  an 
object through his Baldy-file that is itself  not the source of  his Baldy-file. In the latter case, 
the object is mistakenly re-identified as the object which initiated the opening of  his Baldy-
file, and if  the singular-function is correct, thought through and form such a file would 
enable a singular thought — though since it is through the original Baldy-file, this thought 
would be about the nonexistent Baldy instead of  the object that is the dominant source of  
the information stored in the file. Yet this should strike us an absurd consequence, 
particularly if  we are following in the singular thought tradition originating from Russell 
where we are concerned with developing a theory of  when we are thinking de re thoughts 
about particular objects in the external world. This is, after all, the tradition which Evans is 
participating in and why he characterizes singular thoughts as object dependent. In this sense, 
it seems that contrary to her stated intention, Jeshion’s notion of  singular thought as thought 
from and through a mental file should be seen as marking new terminology. 
 Jeshion intends her significance condition to replace an acquaintance condition on 
singular thought, overcome the shortcomings of  semantic instrumentalism, and explain the 
Liberalist intuition that we can have acquaintanceless singular thoughts. The significance 
condition states that “a mental file is initiated on an individual only if  that individual is 
significant to the agent with respect to her plans, projects, affective states, 
motivations” (2010, 136). Consider the following case Jeshion describes as an instance of  an 
agent having a singular thought: 
 In 1859, on the heals of  his successful prediction of  Neptune, Le Verrier postulated   
 that there exists another new planet, an intermercurial planet that would account for   
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 the discrepancy between what classical mechanics predicted as the perihelion of    
 Mercury and the observed perihelion of  Mercury. He named that planet “Vulcan”   
 and for over 50 years, he and astronomers worldwide searched for telescopic    
 evidence to support his conviction. From 1859 until approximately 1910, many   
 professional and amateur astronomers claimed that their telescopic sitings of  black   
 spots traversing past the sun were sitings of  Vulcan. Le Verrier died in 1877 thinking  
 he had discovered Vulcan. Of  course, it turned out he was wrong. The rise of    
 General Relativity in 1915 essentially put an end to the search for Vulcan because the  
 new theory cleanly explained the observed perturbations in Mercury’s orbit by   
 understanding them as a byproduct of  the sun’s gravitational field. (116-117) 
Jeshion rightfully claims that if  Le Verrier can be successfully credited with a thought about 
Vulcan then it would be an instance of  an acquaintanceless singular thought. In support of  
the purported intuition that it does in fact count as an instance of  singular thought, she 
develops the cognitivist framework. Since Vulcan is significant to Le Verrier with respect to 
his plans, projects, affective states, motivations, and so on, the significance condition is met 
and a mental file is triggered. The singular-function of  mental files then dictates that Le 
Verrier is having a singular thought about Vulcan.  
 It is difficult to understand how the significance condition is substantive, since it 
would seem to entail as singular many thoughts which our intuitions strongly suggest are not 
— e.g., hallucinating that you’re being chased by a tiger may be just as significant as being 
chased by a veridical tiger. Furthermore, Jeshion claims that “names, qua names, carry 
significance” (138). Yet this seems to entail that descriptive names, fictional names, empty 
names, and so on all pass the significance condition. If  Jeshion’s cognitivism was intended to 
be a more robust version of  Liberalism and less problematic than semantic instrumentalism 
it is challenging to see how.  
 On the contrary, it seems more plausible to claim that all of  Le Verrier’s thoughts 
about Vulcan are entirely descriptive, since Le Verrier has no independent means through 
which to think of  Vulcan other than through the descriptions he erroneously take to apply to 
it (erroneous because there is no object). Le Verrier has stored information that he thinks is 
co-instantiated by the same object in his Vulcan-file — and, from a cognitive point of  view, 
this is explained by the bundling and identity functions. However, thinking through this file 
itself  does not distinguish singular thought from descriptive thought, as the singular-function 
suggests, since all of  Le Verrier’s ways of  thinking about the purported object through the 
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dossier is purely descriptive.  
 One could, of  course, argue that Le Verrier’s use of  ‘Vulcan’ refers not to an actually 
existing concrete object (as he thought it did), but instead to some possible, nonexistent, or 
abstract object. Evans’ own strategy for dealing with empty names is derived from Frege. He 
claims that “Frege pointed in the direction in which we should look for a way of  
understanding the case where a singular term is empty, namely as involving some sort of  
pretence or appearance of  thought-expression rather than the real thing” (1982, 30). 
However, getting into these suggestions brings us well beyond the scope of  this dissertation. 
For now, what I will note is that despite the fact that all of  these suggestions as to how to 
handle purportedly empty and fictional names are riddled with philosophical difficulties (see 
Hurry 2016),  it seems intuitively odd to claim that Le Verrier’s use of  ‘Vulcan’ refers to an 66
entirely different ontological kind than the kind he intends to refer to. Rather, it seems that 
he is mistaken in thinking that he is thinking singularly of  a thing.  
 For example, if  we take ‘Vulcan’ to refer to a Meinongian object, such objects are typically individuated by 66
their properties. This would entail that each time Le Verrier thinks of  Vulcan as possessing a new property, he is 
thinking of  a new object (see Zalta, 1983). If, instead, we take ‘Vulcan’ to refer to an abstract object, which is 
more palatable, then the question remains as to when the abstract object came into existence (see Thomasson, 
1999). It would seem that Le Verrier’s intention to think about Vulcan would importantly be linked to when 
Vulcan comes into existence. However, if  thinking of  Vulcan is supposed to be singular and not merely 
descriptive, then it would appear that Le Verrier’s initial singular thought about Vulcan would constitute the 
creation of  Vulcan. Yet this seems utterly bizarre. 
VINDICATING  EVANS       86
Chapter 4: Conclusion 
Throughout this dissertation I have argued that armed with a proper understanding of  
Evans’ theory of  singular thought, several Liberalist arguments fail because they either 
misidentify or misevaluate the explicandum with which Evans was concerned. Following in 
the tradition inaugurated by Russell, Evans was concerned with developing a theory of  
object dependent, or Russellian, thought. Throughout The Varieties of  Reference, Evans argues 
a subject can think a Russellian thought if, and only if, (a) the subject has a thought 
containing an Idea that satisfies Russell’s principle, and (b) the object from which the 
information derives is the same as the object identified by that Idea. The Liberalist is tasked 
with refuting both of  these conjuncts. However, as we have seen, their attempts are 
unsuccessful. First, in their attempts to deny (b), they misidentify the type of  thought that 
interested Evans. In this sense, it seems like a genuine possibility that the Liberalists are 
talking past Evans. Second, Jeshion attempts to deny (a) by arguing that it is not Russell’s 
Principle that needs to be satisfied, but rather the significance condition. But the significance 
condition seems to countenance as singular thoughts that our intuitions strongly suggest are 
not — in this sense, cognitivism misevaluates the explicandum.  
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